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Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of 
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another 
Cristina M. Rodríguez† 
The presence of over eleven million unauthorized immigrants in the 
United States1 has generated a wide-ranging and charged debate in recent 
years over the need to overhaul our immigration laws. Among the sug-
gested reforms, the most novel (for the United States) and controversial has 
been the proposal that we adopt a large-scale temporary worker program to 
address current labor needs and channel future flows of unskilled migrants, 
who come primarily from Mexico and Latin America. Since his first term, 
President Bush has been calling for some form of guest worker program,2 
and many of the bills that have emerged from both houses of Congress in 
the last few years have included a temporary worker program as a key 
component of comprehensive immigration reform.3 A guest worker pro-
gram has become the measure favored by those who eschew enforcement-
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 1 See Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in 
the United States 1 (Pew Hispanic Center, Mar 7, 2006), available at <http://www.pewhispanic.org> 
(last visited Jan 20, 2007). 
 2 See, for example, Gustavo Mohar, Mexico-United States Migration: A Long Way to Go (Migra-
tion Policy Institute Mar 1, 2004), available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org> (last visited 
May 7, 2007) (discussing joint statement issued by President Bush and Vicente Fox in 2001 expressing 
commitment to developing a temporary worker program as part of their commitment to “forging a new 
and realistic approach to migration to ensure it is safe, orderly, legal and dignified”); Jim Rutenberg, 
David S. Cloud and Carl Hulse, The Immigration Debate: The Overview; President Calls for Compro-
mise on Immigration NY Times A1 (May 16, 2006) (quoting a speech the president gave the previous 
day: “I support a temporary worker program that would create a legal path for foreign workers to enter 
our country in an orderly way, for a limited period of time.”). 
 3 See, for example, Eliot Turner and Marc R. Rosenblum, Solving the Unauthorized Migration 
Problem: Proposed Legislation in the U.S., (Migration Policy Institute Sept 1, 2005), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org> (last visited May 7, 2007) (discussing legislation introduced 
during the 109th Congress in 2006 that would have adopted a guest worker program); STRIVE Act, 
HR 15 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 22, 2007), available at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c110:H.R.1645:> (last visited May 7, 2007). 
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only strategies in favor of reform that accommodates the market realities 
that have generated the unauthorized population. Advocates of a guest 
worker program acknowledge that the legal admissions system, as cur-
rently designed, cannot manage the patterns of migration generated by 
these market forces. A temporary worker program would address current 
institutional limitations by creating new legal mechanisms for channeling 
the migration likely to persist in the future, no matter how long or high a 
border wall Congress resolves to build. A guest worker program thus 
represents a critical forward-looking complement to legalization programs 
that would permit millions of unauthorized migrants already in the United 
States to become lawful residents, ultimately obviating the need for large-
scale legalization programs in the future. 
This need to devise a solution to the problem of unauthorized migra-
tion, that recognizes the limitations of enforcement-only strategies in an 
integrated hemisphere, is urgent. Unsurprisingly, powerful interest groups 
and public officials in both the United States and Mexico support a tempo-
rary worker program.4 Such a program seemingly would suit the labor 
market needs of the U.S., satisfying domestic employers and consumers, 
and the development needs of Mexico, which depends heavily on remit-
tances from abroad.5 In addition, the regularization of cross-border traffic 
appeals to our humanitarian impulses by providing a legal avenue of mi-
gration for those who otherwise are willing to risk their lives by crossing 
the Arizona or Texas deserts illegally. Similarly, regularization promises to 
protect immigrants from exploitation by smugglers and employers, as well 
as from the general anxiety typical of undocumented migrants’ lives. Tem-
porary worker programs also appeal to current and potential migrants by 
providing them with legal means to support their families in the short-term 
or raise money to finance home construction or business ventures in their 
countries of origin. Add to these promises the allure of cosmopolitanism, 
or the desire to have our immigration policy reflect the fact that we live in 
an increasingly globalized world in which people travel back and forth 
across borders carrying more than one set of political and social alle-
giances, and it is easy to see why diverse parties on both sides of the U.S.-
Mexico border support a policy that facilitates temporary or cyclical migra-
tion. 
  
 4 See, for example, Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip Martin, No such thing as ‘temporary work-
ers,’ Christian Sci Monitor 9 (Dec. 12, 2005) (explaining that a guest worker program is being pushed 
because “some employer and ethnic lobbies expect to benefit” and that “small, concentrated, and well-
financed interest groups . . . expect to profit significantly in the short term”); Francisco Alba, Mexico: A 
Crucial Crossroads, (Migration Policy Institute Mar 2004), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org> (last visited May 7, 2007) (describing history of Mexico’s 
efforts to negotiate a temporary worker program with the United States). 
 5 See Multilateral Investment Fund, Sending Money Home: Leveraging the Development Impact 
of Remittances 1 (Inter-American Development Bank 2006), available at 
<http://www.iadb.org/IDBDocs.cfm?docnum=823579> (last visited May 9, 2007). 
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Despite the idea’s appeal, however, I argue in this Article that we 
should resist the temptation to adopt a large-scale guest worker program, 
because such a program is likely to fail on two interrelated counts: It will 
fail to achieve the short-term objectives supporters claim for it, and it will 
thwart what should be the long-term goals of our immigration policy. On 
the first count, the implicit promise of the guest worker program is that it 
will satisfy the United States’ labor needs while reducing illegal immigra-
tion, thus restoring the rule of law to the system and enabling the govern-
ment to better track immigrants to the U.S.6 As studies of guest worker 
programs consistently reveal, however, though a guest worker program 
may address labor market demands, it will do so at the risk of compound-
ing the illegal immigration problem and perpetuating the poor treatment of 
migrant workers. 
But second, and more importantly, though a guest worker program 
may satisfy many short-term interests, in the long term it will compromise 
our ability to integrate immigrants effectively into the American body poli-
tic, in large part precisely because it will fail to prevent the emergence of a 
new undocumented population. This insight has not been clearly articulated 
in the debate over the guest worker idea, but it should be central to the dis-
cussion. Important participants in the current immigration debate have em-
phasized that the United States can no longer do without a meaningful in-
tegration policy to complement our immigration control measures.7 But 
whether the U.S. should adopt a separate integration policy or not, it is 
critical that the system of immigrant admissions and controls itself reflects 
integrationist aspirations. Proposed reforms should be judged in part by 
whether they will facilitate the incorporation of immigrants and their de-
scendants into American social and civic life. In this Article, I make the 
case that a guest worker program fails this test. 
Both of these conclusions depend on the assumption that many of the 
migrants who are now here illegally, as well as their counterparts in the 
future, have or will form the intent to remain in the United States for pro-
longed periods of time, if not permanently, for reasons that implicate 
Americans’ own needs and preferences as much as the migrants’ aspira-
tions.8 Because of this intent to remain, guest worker programs designed to 
  
 6 See, for example, Rutenberg, Cloud, and Hulse, The Immigration Debate, NY Times (cited in 
note 2) (reviewing President Bush’s speech defending guest worker programs as a means of reducing 
human smuggling, replacing illegal workers with lawful taxpayers, and making certain we know who is 
in our country and why). 
 7 See Spencer Abraham, et al, Immigration and America’s Future: A New Chapter xix–xx (Mi-
gration Policy Institute 2006), Executive Summary available at 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/task_force/new_chapter_summary.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). 
 8 See, for example, Marta Tienda, Be Our Guest?, Am Prospect 19 (Nov 2005) (“Unskilled 
immigration is likely to continue—through legal or clandestine means—owing to brisk growth in 
industries requiring limited skills, the exodus of native workers from declining industries, and the 
powerful role of social networks in recruiting fellow compatriots eager for a share of the American 
wage pie.”). 
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admit workers for limited periods of time are likely to prevent the emer-
gence of an undocumented population only temporarily. And because of 
migrants’ intent to remain, it is essential that our admissions policies reflect 
our long-term interest in ensuring the assimilation9 of immigrants and their 
children into American society. 
Temporary worker programs ultimately thwart this incorporation ob-
jective, because they erect undesirable and otherwise avoidable obstacles to 
the integration process by constraining the two key mechanisms of immi-
grant integration: mobility and reciprocity. Incorporation depends on im-
migrants having mobility—the ability to move freely among society’s 
various sectors as well as in and out of ethnic communities. Receiving so-
cieties logically and rightly expect immigrants to adapt to their new sur-
roundings, but immigrants cannot make good on that obligation without 
mobility. This mobility depends on immigrants’ ability to emerge from 
immigrant sectors of the economy and to develop the social and cultural 
capital necessary for interacting with people and institutions at large—both 
of which depend on the security of what I call the right to remain, or the 
security of a continued presence in the U.S. that guest worker programs do 
not provide. 
Incorporation also depends on extant members of the receiving soci-
ety displaying a reciprocal willingness to adapt to the presence of immi-
grant communities.10 A society’s failure to adapt blocks immigrant assimi-
lation by preventing immigrants from becoming part of important social 
institutions and community relations. The failure to treat immigrants as 
potential members also reflects an absence of the spirit of social coopera-
tion that should characterize a democratic society. Implicit in this concept 
of reciprocity is another important assumption I defend throughout this 
Article. The role the United States and her citizens have played in generat-
ing the forces that produce migration, through our trade, immigration, and 
foreign policies, as well as our economic preferences, coupled with our 
resulting dependence on immigrants from Mexico and Latin America in 
particular, gives rise to the need for an obligation to adapt to immigrant 
presence. 
Guest worker programs ultimately fail to encourage either mobility or 
reciprocity. They impose bureaucratic requirements that constrain immi-
grant mobility in the economy and therefore in society at large. Indeed, 
guest worker programs historically have compounded immigrant isolation 
  
 9 The term “assimilation” carries a lot of freight. I use it interchangeably with the terms “integra-
tion” and “incorporation” and define what I mean by these concepts in Part I A. 
 10 In its 1997 recommendations, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform emphasized the 
reciprocal obligations immigration creates. “Immigrants must accept the obligations we impose—to 
obey our laws, to pay taxes, to respect other cultures and ethnic groups. At the same time, citizens incur 
obligations to provide an environment in which newcomers can become fully participating members of 
our society.” United States Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration 
and Immigrant Policy 7 (1997). 
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and resulted in serious exploitation, both in the U.S. and in other socie-
ties.11 These restraints are exacerbated by the uncertainty guest workers 
experience regarding their long-term prospects in the United States. What 
is more, by treating the immigrant as a temporary fix for the domestic 
economy’s current labor needs, guest worker programs encourage the re-
ceiving society to treat immigrants as mere means to an end rather than as 
potentially permanent members of their communities. The treatment of the 
immigrant as a temporary guest contributes to a climate of inflexibility and 
intolerance vis-à-vis the cultural pluralism immigrants inevitably gener-
ate—a belief that immigrants should be temporary and should not change 
the “character” of our communities. Temporary worker programs thus give 
the receiving society no incentive to adapt to demographic changes or to 
incorporate immigrants into mainstream institutions. The United States’ 
relative success at assimilating large groups of immigrants over time has 
depended on our willingness to treat immigrants as potentially permanent 
members of our society, but current guest worker proposals attempt to ad-
dress a large demographic phenomenon without calling upon that willing-
ness.12 
Of course, various guest worker models exist, and some models are 
more likely to compromise the incorporation objective than others. We can 
think of immigrant admissions policies as existing on an integration con-
tinuum, with the status quo of high levels of illegal immigration on one end 
and the admission of immigrant workers for permanent residence on the 
other. Closest to the illegal immigration model, under which workers’ com-
plete lack of legal status dramatically compromises their ability to inte-
grate, is the sort of program advocated by the White House in the 2007 
incarnation of its immigration proposals. The program would allocate tem-
porary visas to workers for a maximum of six years, require guest workers 
to leave the country every two years for six months at a time, and prohibit 
workers from bringing spouses and children with them.13 This model 
closely resembles the guest worker programs of the infamous Bracero era 
  
 11 Martin Ruhs, Temporary foreign worker programmes: Policies, adverse consequences, and the 
need to make them work, 6 Perspectives on Labour Migration 10–15 (2003), available at 
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/pom/ 
pom6e.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007) (analyzing the consequences of major temporary foreign worker 
programs adopted by several societies in the recent past, including creation of immigrant sectors in the 
economy and conditions of exploitation). 
 12 A guest worker program could include a path to permanent residency and citizenship, of course; 
the McCain-Kennedy bill proposed in the spring of 2006, for example, would have permitted guest 
workers to apply for adjustment of status at the end of their visa cycles. See Secure American and 
Orderly Immigration Act, S 1033/H R 2330 (109th Congress). Without question, no guest worker 
program should be adopted without the possibility of adjustment to permanent status, and the path 
should be relatively clear of bureaucratic obstacles. Though this possibility of adjustment would ad-
dress directly the dangers I identify, I remain skeptical (for reasons given below) that this solution 
would ensure that a guest worker program does not create an outsider class or second class of workers. 
 13 See Talking Nonsense: Bush Administration’s Plan on Immigration Is Divorced from Reality, 
Wash Post A14 (Apr 2, 2007). 
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in the U.S.14 and the models adopted by various developed nations around 
the world. The histories of these programs suggest that they create as many 
problems as they solve.15 
But an alternative model that more closely resembles admission for 
permanent membership does exist, in the form of a provisional worker pro-
gram that gives visa holders the opportunity to adjust to lawful permanent 
status, putting workers on a path to citizenship as long as they meet certain 
criteria. This option has been advocated by Senators Edward Kennedy and 
John McCain in their proposed legislation and is less likely to impose inte-
gration costs than the sort of program currently advocated by the White 
House. What is more, within this model institutional design can make the 
program more or less conducive to integration: adjustment to permanent 
status can be made easy or difficult, and features such as portability of vi-
sas from employer to employer and the ability to sponsor spouses and chil-
dren will help determine the success of guest worker programs. In other 
words, in considering whether to adopt a guest worker program, the choice 
is not of the all-or-nothing variety; some guest worker programs will be 
more likely than others to thwart integrationist objectives. 
That said, even if superior institutional design or other ameliorative 
adjustments might address some of the failures common to guest worker 
policies adopted in other times and places, those experiences provide us 
with powerful cautionary tales that should not go underappreciated. What 
is more, even a guest worker program that successfully reduces undocu-
mented immigration might not meet the criteria of fairness. The United 
States’ adoption of a large-scale guest worker program in response to the 
current crisis of undocumented immigration would signal an important and 
risky shift in our conceptualization of immigration—from an immigration 
policy designed to create permanent members to a policy dependent on 
temporary and ad hoc solutions to inescapable problems.16 This paradigm 
shift may be satisfying in the short-term to immigrants and employers, but 
it represents a troubling turn for a democratic society based on principles of 
social cooperation. The structure of the guest worker program is not consis-
tent with the political obligations we owe to those who, in Michael Wal-
zer’s terms, do “socially necessary work,”17 and with whom we voluntarily 
associate because of our economic preferences. Though my primary aim in 
  
 14 See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America 127–
66 (Princeton 2004) (detailing the history of the Bracero program of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s). I discuss 
the Bracero experience in Part II B. 
 15 For a discussion of this point, see Part II. 
 16 Though our immigration system currently supports a number of small-scale temporary worker 
programs, presenting a large-scale guest worker program as a solution to the unauthorized migration 
crisis would signal a departure from an important commitment to constructing our immigration policy 
to create permanent forms of membership. 
 17 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 60 (Basic Books 
1983). 
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this Article is to demonstrate how guest worker programs threaten immi-
grant integration and are therefore questionable policy, I also take the guest 
worker debate as an opportunity to open up a new and crucial line of in-
quiry into the political obligations we owe both current and future mi-
grants. 
To establish why we should resist the shift toward the type of tempo-
rary solutions embodied by the guest worker program, I explore the practi-
cal and theoretical dimensions of this question in turn. In Part I, I define 
integration and assimilation by considering what the process of incorporat-
ing immigrants into American life entails for both the immigrant and the 
receiving society. I identify the types of mobility crucial for immigrants as 
well as the forms of reciprocity that facilitate successful incorporation. In 
so doing, I consider the extent to which reciprocity is required as both a 
practical matter and as a matter of obligation. In Part II, I consider the ways 
in which a temporary worker program would frustrate immigrant mobility 
and social reciprocity and argue that we should respond to the apparent 
breakdown of the immigrant admissions system by substantially increasing 
the number of permanent visas available to semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. Of course, political support and administrative capacity might not 
exist for such a reform, and the status quo of high levels of unauthorized 
migration is untenable: undocumented immigrants are not mobile, and their 
presence erodes support for immigration, making reciprocity difficult to 
achieve. I therefore give brief consideration to how a temporary worker 
policy should be designed as a second best solution with features that will 
prevent our immigration policy from losing sight of the long-term objec-
tives of immigrant assimilation. 
This inquiry into the relationship between guest worker programs and 
immigrant integration requires the reconciliation of two apparently contra-
dictory ideas. On the one hand, we must acknowledge that we are not in 
complete control of our borders; labor markets and transnational social 
networks are beyond the capacity (and will) of the U.S. government to 
fully regulate. As the result of these forces, migrants develop transnational 
identities, forging lives and affiliations without complete respect for bor-
ders. On the other hand, national citizenship remains a vital institution—an 
essential framework for grounding belonging and organizing political and 
social cooperation. Our vision of who qualifies as a citizen must take into 
account the social and market forces that produce migration, both legal and 
illegal. And the policies we implement to manage that migration at the 
entry stage must not lose sight of the need to produce an integrated body 
politic that mirrors the complexities of migration. 
In assessing guest worker programs for their compatibility with the in-
tegrationist objective, I am not suggesting that our admissions policies 
should not also serve other important goals, nor do I mean to imply that 
each of the components of mobility and reciprocity I identify must be a 
part of any admissions policy. We certainly should strive through the im-
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migration laws to harness the benefits of immigration to our economy and 
our social life, and matters of political viability and cost will limit the ex-
tent to which the components of integration can be fully realized. At the 
same time, however, our admissions policies should reflect who is seeking 
entry and why—the only way truly to address the problem of unauthorized 
migration. Lawmakers should approach the issue in a decidedly pragmatic 
way and ask: Taking certain amounts and types of immigration as a given 
(low-skilled and family-oriented immigration predominantly from Latin 
America), how do we devise an immigration system that ensures effective 
absorption of immigrants in the long-term? 
Though this approach can be used to frame debates about nearly every 
aspect of our immigration system, I focus in this Article on the compatibil-
ity of one major policy proposal with the incorporationist objective. Be-
cause guest worker programs are designed to address one particular type of 
immigration, my observations regarding integration are made with this 
particular group in mind, which is defined by the three interrelated features 
of class, culture, and geography. The migrants who are undocumented to-
day and who would become guest workers consist of low-skilled workers 
and their families who are responding to the imperatives of a semi-
integrated hemispheric market. Though migrants from all over the world 
continue to come to the United States, immigration since 1965 has been 
overwhelmingly Latin American and Asian,18 and the unauthorized migra-
tion that proposed guest worker programs would address is predominantly 
from Mexico and other parts of Latin America.19 Thus not only is this mi-
gration enabled by the labor market, but geography also contributes to its 
persistence. Because the United States has an extended and largely flat land 
border with Mexico, migrants are able to cross into the United States with 
regularity, the Border Patrol notwithstanding. At its core, then, the current 
debate over guest workers is of a piece not only with discussions of the 
rights of workers, but also with consideration of the dramatic growth of the 
Latino population and what that means for the future of American society. 
Much of my discussion will be applicable to other types of migration and 
to other societies, but the characteristics of current unauthorized migration 
  
 18 See Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Assimilation But 
Were Afraid To Ask, in Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, Carola Suárez-Orozco, and Desirée Baolian Qin, 
eds, The New Immigration: An Interdisciplinary Reader 67 (Routledge 2005) (explaining that today 
more than 50 percent of all immigrants are from Latin America and 27% are from Asia). At this stage, 
an obvious but extremely underappreciated point should be made. Latin American immigration is not 
strictly a post-1965 phenomenon, and the Latino presence in the United States is not exclusively the 
result of immigration. Rather, the current wave of immigration is adding to and changing a long-
entrenched and politically powerful population marked by a complex but identifiable “ethnic” (for lack 
of a better word) character. This dynamic underscores that the issue of how to incorporate a Latino 
population into American life is not a strictly transitional matter, in the sense that immigration from 
Eastern Europe, Germany, or Italy has been. 
 19 Passel, Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population at i–ii (cited in note 1) 
(noting that 56 percent of the unauthorized population of 11.5–12 million comes from Mexico, and 
another 22 percent comes from the rest of Latin America). 
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to the U.S. render skepticism regarding guest workers particularly war-
ranted. 
I. MOBILITY, RECIPROCITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH INTEGRATION 
Before considering what immigrant incorporation entails, it is impor-
tant to establish why incorporation should be our goal. After all, guest 
worker programs are arguably designed with the explicit intention of pre-
venting immigrants from integrating into the body politic. Though it is fine 
to debate the moral legitimacy of immigration controls—to have the open 
borders debate—and to contemplate whether we should prefer high-skilled, 
English-speaking immigrants, certain realities require a reorientation of the 
admissions debate. First, some demographers suggest that a substantial 
amount of immigration by unskilled or low-skilled individuals and their 
families, particularly from Latin America, will persist into the future.20 As 
sociologists Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut have emphasized, social 
interconnectedness survives economic imperatives. “Once migrant net-
works have consolidated, they can become sufficiently powerful to sustain 
the movement in the absence of the original economic incentives.”21 Of 
course, some new research suggests that the push factors emanating from 
Mexico may dissipate in the next decade.22 But whether that proves to be 
the case, our need for labor is likely to persist. As Dowell Myers explains 
in his new study of the relationship between immigration and the aging 
baby boomers, immigrant workers across the skilled to unskilled spectrum 
are essential to our economy’s future.23 Any policy discourse or normative 
theorizing regarding the objectives of immigration policy in a liberal state 
that proceeds without these realities at its center is destined for irrele-
vance.24 
  
 20 See Mary C. Waters and Tomás R. Jiménez, Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical 
and Theoretical Challenges, 31 Ann Rev Sociol 105, 107 (2005) (“The social, political, and economic 
forces that spur and perpetuate migration appear to be well entrenched, and we believe that there will 
be a resulting replenishment of immigrants that is likely to be a defining characteristic of American 
immigration for years to come.”). 
 21 See Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait 18 (California 3d 
ed 2006). See also Douglas S. Massey, Luin Goldring, and Jorge Durand, Continuities in Transnational 
Labor Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities, 99 Am J Sociol 1492, 1500 (“Migra-
tion also changes the cultural context within which decisions are made, and international movement 
becomes increasingly attractive for reasons that are not purely economic.”). 
 22 See, for example, Shannon O’Neil, Will we have enough workers? Palm Beach Post 12A (Apr 
9, 2007) (citing study by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development indicating that over 
the next ten years roughly five million fewer workers will enter the United States, suggesting that 
“demography may accomplish what border enforcement has not”). 
 23 See Dowell Myers, Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for the Future of 
America 37–38 (Russell Sage 2007). 
 24 By emphasizing this reality, I do not mean to suggest it would be illegitimate for immigration 
policy makers or theorists to consider creating incentives for certain types of immigrants, namely high-
skilled immigrants, to come to the United States, or that it would be illegitimate or ill-advised to set 
caps on the numbers of immigrants permitted to enter each year. Of course, our efforts to attract highly-
skilled immigrants raises another vexing moral issue concerning the extent to which such policies 
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Given these realities, a focus on integration would promote social 
peace. It is in our interest to acknowledge that migrants are here to stay and 
to facilitate their becoming functional and well-adjusted members of our 
society. As Myers contends in calling for a new social contract between 
immigrants and Americans, investing in the integration of immigrants to-
day will create the workers and taxpayers we will depend on in the fu-
ture.25 And as Hiroshi Motomura has emphasized, the European societies 
that recruited foreign workers in the 1960s and ’70s without making a cor-
responding commitment to integrating them into their societies now face 
serious social cleavages as a result.26 
A focus on integration is also proper as a political matter. As I de-
velop in detail in Part II of this Article, the people to whom guest worker 
visas would be made available are people to whom we have associative 
obligations. Their migration is inspired not simply by the lack of employ-
ment or development in their home countries, but also by choices Ameri-
cans have made at the level of trade policy, as well as by the more quotid-
ian desire for the less expensive consumer goods that immigrant labor fa-
cilitates. These economic choices give rise to social relationships whereby 
immigrant workers become connected to lawful residents and U.S. citizens. 
By virtue of our participation in the creation of these forms of association, 
we have a political duty to take account of and cooperate with these social 
networks, which means incorporating immigrants into our society as more 
than laborers. Hemispheric economic integration is giving rise to a need for 
political union of some kind marked by a sense of shared governance and 
  
compromise the ability of developing countries to continue their development. Whether “brain drain” 
always impedes development is debated, and the relationship between migration and development is 
complex. But efforts by receiving countries to attract high-skilled workers from developing countries 
must be understood as raising substantial moral concerns. In addition, it may be that temporary worker 
programs that provide incentives for migrants to return to their home countries are optimal from a 
development perspective—an outcome that should inform our own policy and sense of obligation. The 
connections between migration, development, temporary worker programs, and remittances are just 
now coming to be understood. For a discussion of the links between temporary migration programs and 
development, consider Dovelyn Agunias, Linking Temporary Worker Schemes with Development, 
(Migration Policy Institute Feb 1, 2007), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=581> (last visited Apr 3, 2007); Peggy 
Levitt and Ninna Nyberg-Sørensen, Global Migration Perspectives: The transnational turn in migra-
tion studies (Global Commission on International Migration 2004), available at 
<http://www.gcim.org/gmp/Global%20Migration%20Perspectives% 
20No%206.pdf> (last visited Apr 3, 2007); Raul Delgado-Wise and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Migration 
and Development: Lessons from the Mexican Experience (Migration Policy Institute 2007), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/ 
display.cfm?id=581> (last visited Apr 3, 2007). 
 25 See Myers, Immigrants and Boomers at 258 (cited in note 23) (“A[n important] step in building 
the hopeful future is to accelerate the rate of integration of immigrants into the mainstream of U.S. 
society and the U.S. economy. We need to assist their economic advancement and their full participa-
tion in our society, including early incorporation into our democratic political process. . . . [Another] 
necessary step is for citizen-voters and taxpayers to embrace the homegrown strategy and increase their 
investment in the education of the next generation.”). 
 26 See Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 Stan L Rev 857, 869–70 
(2007). 
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reciprocal political rights and duties. One way to make these broader forms 
of cooperation possible is to integrate into our political and social institu-
tions those individuals who have relocated to the U.S. and thus participate 
in the person-to-person contact that creates the need for forms of political 
engagement across borders and without respect to legal citizenship status. 
Finally, striving to integrate new populations into existing political 
and social structures is itself worthwhile. It is important to avoid overin-
vestment in the cultural or demographic status quo, or in insulating our-
selves from the change that integration inevitably brings.27 As I have ex-
plained in previous work, cultural evolution is not only unavoidable, it 
represents an inherent good—not just for the assimilating immigrant, but 
for the receiving society, which depends on the regular infusion of striving 
immigrants for its continuing vitality.28 As I make clear below, I am ag-
nostic with respect to what American society ultimately should look like as 
an aesthetic and cultural matter. The point is that we should not resist the 
political imperatives that require integration in an effort to stop the change 
that immigrant incorporation produces, in part because that change pro-
duces value. 
A. Incorporation as Process 
Before we can establish how guest worker programs threaten immi-
grant incorporation, we must explore in more detail what incorporation 
entails. The process by which immigrants become Americans has been 
described using various terms. The term “assimilation” has an inescapably 
political dimension, and attempts to define and critique the concept fill 
volumes.29 At the level of public discourse and ideology, “assimilation” is 
synonymous with a melting pot narrative according to which immigrants 
shed the customs of their homelands as they become true Americans. For 
some, assimilation is inexorable and romantic. For others, the melting pot 
narrative oversimplifies a process that is complex and involves change that 
is not necessarily linear for either the immigrant or society. For still others, 
the association of “assimilation” with the melting pot view of American 
identity renders it a loaded word, redolent of a historical tradition of coer-
  
 27 Compare K. Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers 101, 113 (W 
W Norton & Co 2006) (discussing the value of cultural contamination, in the context of the debate over 
the effects of mass culture on local traditions, and noting that “[w]e do not need, have never needed, 
settled community, a homogeneous system of values, in order to have a home. Cultural purity is an 
oxymoron.”). 
 28 I have discussed my view of the instrumental and democracy-promoting value of cultural chal-
lenge in change elsewhere. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 Cal L Rev 687, 
726–28 (2006). 
 29 See, for example, Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimila-
tion and Contemporary Immigration 17–66 (Harvard 2003) (describing and critiquing various assimila-
tion theories). Consider Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin, eds, The New Immigration (cited in 
note 18). 
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cion, xenophobia, and disrespect for the cultural differences embodied by 
immigrants and minority communities in the United States. 
But assimilation is also descriptive. I invoke it in this Article along-
side the terms integration and incorporation to describe a process of inevi-
table change—a conception of assimilation highlighted in a recent report of 
the Pew Hispanic Center, which noted that the term “is now broadly ac-
cepted as a way to describe the ways that immigrants and their offspring 
change as they come in contact with their host society.”30 When used in 
this way, assimilation “does not imply any superiority in the host society’s 
views or a particular value to the changes in attitudes and behavior among 
immigrants across generation [sic].”31 
Current sociological use of the term takes this focus on change one 
step further by emphasizing its bidirectional nature. Sociologists define 
“assimilation” as a two-way phenomenon, as opposed to a linear and com-
plete absorption of the immigrant into a static and extant culture, and use 
assimilation to describe “the process by which the characteristics of mem-
bers of immigrant groups and host societies come to resemble one an-
other.”32 In other words, assimilation is a phenomenon that changes immi-
grants and the host society alike. 
Of course, from a policymaker’s perspective, simply describing the 
process of change might be beside the point. He or she might want to iden-
tify an acceptable endpoint to the assimilation process to know when it has 
occurred and to direct the process toward the socially desired objective. 
Classical assimilation theory identifies such an endpoint. It describes im-
migrants as “following a ‘straight-line’ convergence,” according to which 
they increasingly resemble the host society as time passes, beginning with 
“close social relations” with members of the host society, “followed by 
large-scale intermarriage,” and ending in “ethnic identification” with the 
mainstream.33 This definition presupposes the existence of an identifiable 
mainstream, and it suggests that it is possible to measure the success or 
failure of assimilation by comparing the current state of members of an 
immigrant group to the Americanized end state they are supposed to 
achieve through assimilation. 
But, of course, the “mainstream” is elusive. Even contemporary 
“melting pot” theorists34 emphasize that the assimilation process changes 
the host society, making it difficult to identify assimilation’s endpoint. 
  
 30 See Pew Hispanic Center, Assimilation and Language: Survey Brief 1 (Pew Hispanic Center 
March 2004), available at <http://www.pewhispanic.org> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Susan K. Brown and Frank D. Bean, Assimilation Models, Old and New: Explaining a Long-
Term Process 1 (Migration Policy Institute Oct 1, 2006), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=442> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). 
 33 Id. 
 34 For an example of contemporary melting pot theory and an attempt to revive and redefine the 
concept of assimilation, consider Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream (cited in note 29). 
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Immigration ensures that a society’s mainstream evolves, taking on charac-
teristics that originally would have been ascribed to the immigrant.35 As a 
result, defining the assimilated endpoint of a given immigration wave is 
largely a retrospective project for historians, not an aspirational project for 
policymakers. The latter lack adequate tools to shape culture to fit prede-
termined conceptions of the desired outcome. Attempts by policymakers to 
identify the mainstream into which immigrants should be assimilating are 
likely to be beset by nostalgia, artificiality, or coercive attempts to recap-
ture a world that no longer exists.36 
In devising policies that promote assimilation, then, the real concern 
for policymakers should not be whether immigration policy is sustaining 
the status quo37 or producing a preferred cultural outcome. Instead, the 
focus should be on whether a given policy will help the bidirectional proc-
ess of assimilation unfold successfully—whether it will help integrate im-
migrants into political and social institutions and enhance their chances for 
success. Successful assimilation, in turn, should be defined by immigrants 
becoming full participants in the country’s economic, social, and cultural 
life—by their becoming not only contributors, but also equals. Success 
further depends on whether immigration is absorbed with minimal social 
cleavages and inter-group competition. To achieve this success, policy-
makers should attempt: (1) to reduce obstacles to the immigrant’s success-
ful navigation of each of the different measures of assimilation; and (2) to 
normalize the presence of immigrants and their descendants in society at 
  
 35 See, for example, Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1502 (cited in note 21). 
The authors explain: 
As migrants become part of established communities in the host country, they adapt them-
selves to the local setting. Whether or not they have legal documents, they send their chil-
dren to school, learn a minimum of the host country’s language, and use financial institu-
tions and social services. Over time the local landscape of the receiving community is trans-
formed. . . . the migrants contribute to the creation and growth of a market for specialized 
foods, entertainment, and cultural products. The formation of ethnic neighborhoods repre-
sents a process of socioeconomic adaptation and transformation that permits many “foreign” 
practices to be maintained in the new setting. 
Id (citations omitted). 
 36 In a country as large and historically diverse as the United States, it is inevitable that incorpora-
tion will occur on different terms in different regions depending on the characteristics and history of the 
resident population, despite decisions made by the federal government with respect to immigrant ad-
missions. 
 37 It is worth noting that when Congress adopted national origin quotas for immigration during the 
1920s, it was trying to accomplish precisely this objective: to ensure that subsequent immigration 
would mirror the population as it then stood. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin, and 
Hiroshi Motomura, eds, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 158–59 (West 2003), citing 
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National 
Interest, Staff Report (1981). In formulating the quotas, Congress relied on the 1890 Census, rather 
than the Census of 1910, because the former reflected a population with more “desirable” cultural 
characteristics. Id. This reliance resulted in a reduction of the Italian, Polish, and Greek quotas and 
increased quotas for Northern European countries. Id. Congress sought to use the immigrant admissions 
system to shape the cultural character of American society, thus feeding a Nativist ideology that deni-
grated certain groups of immigrants in service of a nostalgic view of American society. Id. 
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large with minimal social and political conflict over the adaptations that the 
existing society must undergo to make this possible. 
In the end, there are two plausible answers to the question: what sort 
of society do we want to have at the end of the process? First, the answer is 
political, not cultural. We should insist on an outcome where the people 
who live here are equal participants, but it would be futile to insist on cul-
tural particularities. Second, we cannot know what sort of society large-
scale immigration will produce, and we should temper the inevitable im-
pulse toward defining our ideal immigration endpoint with this realization. 
The best we can do is to enforce consistently the premise that a mutuality 
of obligation exists as we negotiate this process. Immigrants and citizens 
alike bear the burden of ensuring that immigrants become members. It is 
precisely because guest worker programs make these obligations difficult 
to fulfill that we should be wary of adopting such programs. 
B. Immigrant Adaptation and Mobility 
Immigrant adaptation can be measured by considering the trajectories 
of different cohorts. We might measure assimilation, on the one hand, by 
how the immigrant generation is adjusting. My core subjects—the current 
undocumented immigrant and the possible future guest worker—represent 
this cohort. On the other hand, a complete measure of assimilation requires 
understanding how the children of immigrants, who may have been born in 
the U.S. or who may have immigrated at a young age and therefore may 
not identify with the immigrant experience, are faring. Sociologists and 
demographers who measure assimilation are now profitably conducting 
longitudinal studies of the second generation,38 as well as of immigrants 
who arrived in the United States as children. Not only do such measures 
give us a better sense of how immigration affects American society in the 
long term, they also make for more complete assessments of the absorption 
process. 
This multi-generational perspective is particularly crucial, given our 
jus soli, or birthright citizenship, rule.39 The jus soli rule reflects a com-
mitment to treating anyone born in the United States as an equal. Under-
standing the processes of cultural adaptation experienced by the second 
generation is therefore essential to promoting equal citizenship. Relatedly, 
the jus soli rule means that the status of the second generations’ parents is 
of similar concern, given that the parents’ success will affect their chil-
dren’s prospects. Because both immigration policies and the public atti-
  
 38 See, for example, Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, The New Second Generation: Segmented 
Assimilation and Its Variants, in Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin, eds, The New Immigration, 
85, 85–86 (cited in note 18) (noting the need, in evaluating the “new” immigration since 1965, to focus 
on the second generation, in addition to the immigrant generation). 
 39 See US Const, Amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside.”). 
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tudes surrounding those policies ultimately affect the options and status of 
the second generation, we must consider whether immigration policies 
erect obstacles to the assimilation of this generation. 
In addition to considering the generational components of assimila-
tion, we must also consider that assimilation entails adjustments of differ-
ent sorts; it has important cultural, economic, and socio-political dimen-
sions. Each of these dimensions often reinforces the others, though it is 
also possible that one sort of assimilation can occur even if another is 
blocked. Moreover, each aspect of assimilation may unfold at different 
rates for different individual immigrants, as well as for different immigrant 
groups.40 In fact, recent sociological research shows that assimilation has 
declined for some groups, whose second generations find themselves less 
well off economically and in terms of health outcomes and educational 
attainment than the immigrant generation, contrary to conventional expec-
tations.41 This phenomenon of downward assimilation suggests that both 
immigration and integration policy should be attentive to potential differ-
ences among immigrant groups as they negotiate the processes of assimila-
tion—differences that often will manifest themselves in terms of race and 
class. 
When considering the different types of assimilation, popular con-
sciousness focuses most immediately on cultural adaptation. Linguistic 
diversity suggests the presence of the unassimilated, and popular discourse 
often focuses on the acquisition of English language skills as the most sig-
nificant marker of adaptation. As a number of sociological studies have 
demonstrated, immigrant groups today follow this particular path of as-
similation in the predicted manner: the immigrant generation acquires Eng-
lish-language speaking ability, the second generation acquires English pro-
  
 40 See Brown and Bean, Assimilation Models (cited in note 32) (“[G]roups may vary in the appar-
ent incompleteness of their assimilation for a number of reasons, including the level of human capital 
(education) they bring with them and the social and economic structure of the society they enter.”). It is 
the case that 
[d]ifferent aspects of assimilation may also vary in completeness at any point in time. For 
example, an immigrant may master a host-country language faster than he or she matches 
the earnings of the native born. Finally, the incompleteness of assimilation may be similarly 
affected across groups if economic or other structural changes were to reduce most people’s 
chances of economic mobility. 
Id. 
 41 See, for example, Suárez-Orozco, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Assimilation at 
75–77 (cited in note 18). See also Portes and Zhou, The New Second Generation at 89–90 (cited in note 
38). Compare Nancy Foner and Richard Alba, The Second Generation from the Last Great Wave of 
Immigration: Setting the Record Straight (Migration Information Source Oct 1, 2006), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org> (last visited Jan 20, 2007) (noting that despite popular mythol-
ogy to the contrary, the southern and eastern European immigrants of the turn of the twentieth century, 
particularly Italians, also faced considerable obstacles to assimilation, experiencing only a “slow and 
gradual” climb into society’s mainstream that was punctuated by “painful setbacks and difficulties”). 
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ficiency but is often bilingual, and the ability to speak the immigrant lan-
guage tapers off by the third generation.42 
Beyond this linguistic adaptation, cultural assimilation might also in-
volve changes in attitudes about certain practices or social structures that 
are shaped by religion and culture, such as attitudes about family life, pre-
marital sex, homosexuality, and abortion.43 These two forms of adaptation 
appear to be mutually reinforcing, as the acquisition of English correlates 
with the development of attitudes more closely in line with the general 
population’s views.44 This correlation is, of course, complicated. It is not 
inexorably positive for immigrant views to approximate the median view in 
the country—both because diversity of perspective is generally valuable, 
but also because there may well be instances in which we would prefer the 
general population’s values to more closely mirror immigrants’ values, as 
might be the case with the heightened significance many immigrants place 
on family. And despite this connection between English-language ability 
and convergence with median public views, the ability to speak English is 
not necessarily an indication of comprehensive assimilation, as the down-
ward assimilation data suggest,45 nor is limited English-language ability 
necessarily a sign that immigrants have not or are not adapting to life in the 
United States in other ways by holding down jobs and forming social net-
works. 
It is also important to emphasize that the process of cultural adapta-
tion unfolds in a variety of settings. For immigrant children and the second 
generation, adaptation occurs in the public schools, but adult immigrants 
simply do not have access to such an assimilating institution. Instead, 
through formal adult literacy programs, the workplace, interaction with 
market and governmental institutions, and exposure to popular culture, 
  
 42 For studies demonstrating that post-1965 immigrants are assimilating linguistically, see Rubén 
Rumbaut, Douglas S. Massey, and Frank D. Bean, Linguistic Life Expectancies: Immigrant Language 
Retention in Southern California, 32 Population & Dev Rev 447, 454–55 (2006); Alba and Nee, Re-
making the American Mainstream at 219–21 (cited in note 29); Pew Hispanic Center, Assimilation and 
Language at 1 (cited in note 30). 
 43 Pew Hispanic Center, Assimilation and Language at 3–4 (cited in note 30). 
 44 According to a recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center there is a relationship between linguis-
tic assimilation and these changes in attitudes: 
[L]anguage contributes to differences in attitudes substantially even after controlling for 
other factors, such as age, gender, level of education, income, place of residence . . . country 
of origin, political party, religion, citizenship, and generation in the United States. For ex-
ample, . . . it is estimated that . . . 93% of Spanish-dominant Latinos agree that it is better for 
children to live in their parents’ home until they get married . . . . [whereas] 71% [of Eng-
lish-dominant Latinos] are estimated to feel the same way. 
Id at 3. The study also estimates that 70 percent of English-dominant Latinos find divorce acceptable, 
but only 51 percent of Spanish-dominant Latinos agree. Id. 
 45 Compare Portes and Zhou, The New Second Generation at 90 (cited in note 38) (describing the 
experience of Haitian immigrants in Miami and noting that, contrary to conventional expectations, 
“adopting the outlooks and cultural ways of the native-born does not represent, as in the past, the first 
step toward social and economic mobility but may lead to the exact opposite”). 
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adult immigrants negotiate cultural adaptation. The cultural aspect of as-
similation is thus overarching and occurs as immigrants manage the other 
components of adjustment. 
The extent to which an immigrant has adapted to his new surround-
ings can also be measured in economic and labor-based terms. Most immi-
grants move in hopes of making economic gains, and there are a number of 
ways of measuring economic incorporation. One way to consider this proc-
ess of adjustment is to measure immigrants’ economic fortunes—are their 
wages increasing; are they acquiring financial stability and security 
through home ownership and greater access to health care and other kinds 
of insurance; and what are the economic prospects for the second genera-
tion? Do the rising fortunes of immigrants themselves translate into better 
prospects and security for their children? We might also consider the extent 
to which immigrants themselves emerge from immigrant-dominated sec-
tors of the economy and whether they and their children are working as 
equals of nonimmigrants in ethnically integrated workplaces. Economic 
advancement, like English-language acquisition, will inevitably enable 
other aspects of assimilation. Entering integrated workplaces will lead to 
cultural and social assimilation, and enhanced economic security may 
translate into political and other forms of power. The critical question, 
along this dimension, is to what extent immigrants’ economic fortunes are 
improving or becoming more secure. 
Finally, beyond the obvious cultural and economic indicia of immi-
grant adaptation, other forms of adjustment to life in a new society are also 
worth measuring and facilitating. Various forms of socio-political adjust-
ment will be part of any immigrant’s transition to a full and complete life 
in society. Forms of social integration, such as participation in churches, 
schools, and community groups such as sports leagues will be part of the 
formation of the social support networks essential to living a stable life. In 
many instances, these networks will be made up of co-ethnics. But it would 
be a mistake to consider the existence of such affiliations as a sign of fail-
ure to assimilate, for these affiliations are crucial to the accumulation of 
social capital necessary for survival and social development in a new soci-
ety, and they complement or offset the challenges of entering into more 
integrated environments.46 
  
 46 Id at 90 (“[I]mmigrant youths who remain firmly ensconced in their respective ethnic communi-
ties may, by virtue of this fact, have a better chance for educational and economic mobility through use 
of the material and social capital that their communities make available.”). See also Suárez-Orozco, 
Everything You Wanted to Know About Assimilation at 80 (cited in note 18). Suárez-Orozco notes that: 
[M]aintaining a sense of belonging and social cohesion with their immigrant roots is equally 
important [to developing skills and work habits required to thrive today]. When immigrant 
children lose their expressive culture, social cohesion is weakened, parental authority is un-
dermined, and interpersonal relations suffer. The unthinking call for immigrant children to 
abandon their culture can only result in loss, anomie, and social disruption. 
Id. See also Lily Wong Filmore, When Learning a Second Language Means Losing the First, in 
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Immigrant social networks might also facilitate pre-citizenship politi-
cal activity or the organization of immigrants in defense of their interests. 
Examples of such organization include participation in labor unions, which 
connect immigrants not only with their own co-ethnics, but also with 
members of other immigrant groups and native-born Americans.47 By par-
ticipating in what scholars have called economic or labor citizenship,48 
immigrants develop the capacity and incentive to engage fellow workers 
and citizens to articulate and defend mutual interests—a process likely to 
promote social connectedness as well as broader forms of concerted or 
political action. The immigrants’ rights demonstrations held across the 
country in the spring of 2006 also reflect a form of pre-citizenship political 
activity, as do efforts to organize immigrants at the local level to agitate for 
government attention, including the right to vote in some contexts.49 
By defining assimilation in cultural, economic, social, and political 
terms, I am not suggesting that these concepts are themselves singular or 
that other forms of adaptation are irrelevant in assessing how immigrants 
incorporate. Rather, this taxonomy emphasizes that assimilation is a multi-
faceted phenomenon whose dimensions sometimes reinforce one another, 
and sometimes outpace one another for different immigrant individuals and 
groups. 
The common thread among each of these forms of adjustment, how-
ever, is that their unfolding requires agency and hence, mobility. Cultural 
assimilation will depend on access to communities outside the world of co-
ethnics. Economic advancement similarly will depend on the ability to take 
advantage of the market. But the viability of this movement also depends 
on immigrants’ ability to withstand its inevitable challenges. Particularly 
for immigrants who have not yet learned English, achieving economic ad-
vancement will depend on the existence of some kind of social safety net. 
This support could come in the form of accessible (for example, translated 
and interpreted) government or employer assistance, but often it will come 
in the form of social and political support provided by families, immigrant 
social networks, and formally organized immigrant groups, as well as lar-
ger social groups with immigrant organizing agendas, such as labor unions. 
  
Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin, eds, The New Immigration, 289, 302–06 (cited in note 18) 
(describing how children’s loss of their capacity to speak a home language has dramatic implications 
for family relations, as well as for children’s capacities to socialize). 
 47 See generally Ruth Milkman, ed, Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Con-
temporary California (ILR 2000). I discuss how immigrant organizing is facilitated through the use of 
Spanish and other languages in Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 104 Nw 
U L Rev 1689 (2006). This phenomenon underscores how the process of assimilation depends on the 
mobilization of the “hybrid identities and bi-cultural capacities” discussed above. See Suárez-Orozco, 
Everything You Wanted to Know About Assimilation at 80 (cited in note 18). 
 48 See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, S Cal L Rev (forthcoming 2007) (ar-
ticulating a concept of “labor citizenship” that refers to “participation by workers in collective efforts to 
achieve recognition of and compensation for their economic contributions to society”). 
 49 See Ron Hayduk, Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United States 
63 (Routledge 2006). 
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Exercising mobility thus depends on having security anchors that 
compensate for the risks that movement entails. Mobility, therefore, should 
not be understood as a straight line out of immigrant communities, but 
rather as a form of action that enables movement in and out of immigrant 
sectors and that, in some cases, depends on those sectors to make move-
ment possible.50 In short, incorporation requires attention not just to immi-
grants’ chances outside of their own communities, but also to the dynamics 
and hence vitality of those communities themselves. 
C. Receiving Society Adaptation 
It is relatively easy to identify the types of adjustment immigrants un-
dergo when they reach the United States, and the fortunes of immigrants 
can be compared to those of the native born, enabling us to estimate how 
well immigrants are adapting to life in the United States. But what assimi-
lation means for the receiving society is somewhat more obscure and diffi-
cult to describe, particularly when we shift our focus from the short-term 
impacts created by the initial arrival of immigrants to the medium- and 
longer-term changes engendered by gradually assimilating immigrants and 
their descendants. 
Immigration clearly changes the geography of the host society, and 
that change is easy to see in the short term. Each period in American im-
migration history is characterized by the emergence of unique immigrant 
neighborhoods and towns, where languages other than English thrive for 
some period of time, and where ethnically defined businesses and civic 
groups persist even longer.51 But these communities change in character as 
time passes. Some immigrant neighborhoods eventually disappear as im-
migrants gradually integrate with the population at large over one or two 
generations, perhaps maintaining ethnic restaurants and festival-like tradi-
tions, in the spirit of New York’s Little Italy. Some immigrant neighbor-
hoods remain immigrant neighborhoods but become populated by new 
groups of immigrants—a trend exemplified by the transformation of New 
York’s Lower East Side in the twentieth century. 
  
 50 Some of the latest research on immigrant assimilation describes the process as segmented: 
Instead of a relatively uniform mainstream whose mores and prejudices dictate a common 
path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation. One of them rep-
licates the time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the 
white middle-class; a second leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty 
and assimilation into the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement 
with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity. 
Portes and Zhou, The New Second Generation at 90 (cited in note 38). 
 51 Consider John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 
(Rutgers 2002); Heinz Kloss, The American Bilingual Tradition (Center for Applied Linguistics and 
Delta Systems 1998); Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of 
America (Russell Sage 2006). 
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This narrative of transition suggests the gradual disappearance of the 
immigrant identity and contribution. But surely large-scale immigration 
leaves a mark on the receiving society, even as the immigrant generation 
gives way to the second or third generation and immigrant neighborhoods 
disappear. Perhaps the clearest long-term change that has resulted from 
immigration is the religious pluralism of our society.52 Though Catholi-
cism and Judaism as practiced today may look considerably different from 
the religions as practiced by the European immigrants of the early twenti-
eth century, religious pluralism, unlike linguistic pluralism, has persisted 
across generations despite the virulent nativism directed toward the immi-
grant groups that brought those faiths to the United States.53 
Apart from these obvious transformations, the long-term changes re-
sulting from immigration elude straightforward measurement; as immi-
grant contributions become normalized into generally accepted ideas of 
regional or American culture, the immigrant origins of those contributions 
can be difficult to pinpoint. Take the case of the German immigration of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before World War I, the 
Midwest was populated by thriving German communities. Some cities, 
such as Cincinnati, supported German-language schools, and some local 
governments functioned in German.54 Through a process of assimilation 
accelerated by extreme public and legal coercion during World War I, 
however, German ethnic identity and cultural institutions became increas-
ingly marginal, and the German language has almost no presence in the 
United States today.55 It nonetheless seems implausible that German im-
migration had no impact on American culture. But how would we describe 
that impact? Can it be reduced to picturesque German architecture and the 
German-language surnames that are considered to be mainstream Ameri-
can, or did German immigration have some more fundamental impact? 
A second narrative of transition adds further complexity to this pic-
ture. In some cases, despite the passage of time, neighborhoods, towns, and 
even regions retain an identifiable ethnic orientation, with varying levels of 
immigrant presence interspersed among a larger population of English-
dominant residents who may still identify in some way with either the cul-
  
 52 See, for example, David Rieff, Nuevo Catholics, NY Times Mag 640 (Dec 24, 2006) (discuss-
ing the general decline of Catholicism in the U.S. along with its growth in Hispanic areas of the U.S.). 
 53 For an account of this nativism, see Higham, Strangers in the Land at 60–63, 66–67, 160–61 
(cited in note 51) (describing nativism directed towards Catholics, Italians, and Jews). 
 54 See, for example, Zolberg, A Nation by Design (cited in note 51). [ED: I know Zolberg has 
extended discussions of German immigrants in his book. I unfortunately left this till the last minute 
before leaving the country and haven’t been able to check for pincites, or for specific reference to 
Cincinnati—hopefully I can find such a source in the last round.] 
 55 John Higham describes this anti-German hysteria that took hold after 1915. Local officials 
banned the sale of German newspapers, various states banned the teaching of the German language in 
the public schools on the theory that the study of language “served to inculcate un-American ideas,” 
German opera was boycotted, sauerkraut became known as “liberty cabbage,” and “many towns, firms, 
and individuals with German names changed them.” See Higham, Strangers in the Land at 208 (cited in 
note 51). 
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ture of origin, or some form of ethnic culture that has developed over time 
inside the United States. The Latino communities of the Southwest and 
major American cities exemplify this pattern. Though it may be occurring 
today in unprecedented numbers, immigration from Latin America is 
hardly a new phenomenon (and Latino presence is not all the result of im-
migration). Names, idioms, customs, and forms of aesthetic culture shaped 
through the interaction of new immigrants and established Latino commu-
nities are etched into the identities of communities around the country and 
may be accurately described as “mainstream.” 
The complexity of identifying long-term immigrant contributions 
again underscores that our immigration policy should not attempt to 
achieve defined cultural outcomes. As with the process of immigrant adap-
tation, my primary purpose is not to identify or describe the long-term 
changes immigration brings to the receiving society. Though it would pro-
vide a nice bookend to the trans-generational work describing how immi-
grants have fared, identifying the new “mainstream” that emerges with 
each successive wave of immigration is largely beside the point. Struggling 
to identify the contributions of immigrant generations after they have first 
arrived distracts attention from the far more pressing task of facilitating the 
absorption of the immigrants currently seeking entry. It is sufficient to em-
phasize that the receiving society changes as a result of immigration and 
therefore participates in and negotiates the process of assimilation, just as 
immigrants do. 
And just as the relevant focus of the inquiry into immigrant adaptation 
should be on the process of adaptation, our focus when considering the 
receiving society’s transformation should be on the mechanisms the receiv-
ing society uses to adjust—on the reciprocal willingness and ability of the 
receiving society to adapt to demographic change. The relevant descriptive 
questions include: what immediate changes does the host society experi-
ence as a result of immigration, and what forms of adaptation emerge in 
response? 
Two central features of current immigration make this inquiry more 
concrete. First, as noted at the outset, a guest worker program would pri-
marily address migration from Mexico and Latin America. Focusing our 
discussion of immigration in this way makes the issue of receiving-society 
assimilation easier to manage. The effects of migration run the gamut from 
the aesthetic and environmental to the structural and institutional. The en-
vironmental effects include the prevalence of the Spanish language in pub-
lic spaces, from workplaces across the country56 to the streets and store-
fronts of American cities and towns, through ever-expanding Spanish-
language media,57 and a services sector more focused on Latino communi-
  
 56 I discuss in detail the impact immigration and language diversity have had on American work-
places in Rodríguez, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1689 (cited in note 47). 
 57 See generally Arlene Davila, Latinos, Inc.: The Marketing and Making of A People (Cal 2001) 
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ties. Through the profusion of Spanish-speaking students and patients, 
many of whom are vulnerable because of their undocumented status, public 
institutions such as schools and hospitals feel the immediate effects of im-
migration generally, and unauthorized immigration in particular. Finally, 
by contributing to the growth of the Latino population, immigration is 
transforming the political stature of Latinos by capturing the attention of 
politicians looking to secure votes, though it remains too early to specify 
the full extent of this effect.58 
The second distinctive feature of current immigration is its impact on 
the demography of states, suburbs, and rural areas with limited pre-1990 
experience with immigration.59 Though they remain concentrated in the 
so-called gateway states and cities,60 many immigrants are bypassing these 
traditional destinations and settling in suburban and rural areas with mini-
mal previous exposure to immigrant communities, as well as in states not 
traditionally associated with immigration.61 North Carolina, for example—
a state historically without a Latino population—has one of the fastest 
growing populations of Latino immigrants in the country62 
Immigrants are transforming these new destinations demographically, 
and the response of the destinations’ residents has been mixed. A recently 
released study of five of the new immigration states reveals a similar pat-
tern of adjustment in each location: states and localities initially accommo-
date the immigrant influx, in some cases actively recruiting new immi-
  
(assessing how the Spanish-language media in the United States are constructing conceptions of latini-
dad, or Hispanic identity). 
 58 Early analyses of the 2006 mid-term elections noted the significance of the shift of Latino 
voters from Republicans to Democrats, a shift of greater magnitude than the reorientation of blacks and 
whites. Pew Hispanic Center, Latinos and the 2006 Mid-term Election 2 (Pew Hispanic Center Nov 27, 
2006), available at <http://pewhispanic.org/files/ 
factsheets/26.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). An early study of exit poll data conducted by the Pew 
Hispanic Center revealed an 11-point swing between 2004 and 2006 in favor of Democrats, whereas 
the swing among white voters was 6 percent. Id. According to the study, “something distinctive oc-
curred among Latino voters this year that rewarded the Democrats and punished the Republicans,” id at 
2, but it would be premature to connect that “something distinctive” to the immigration issue, consider-
ing the mixed results on the immigration question in Arizona. Id at 3. See also Maria Echeveste, Rising 
Tide: What the Midterm Election Results Tell Us About Hispanic Voters, Am Prospect (Dec 22, 2006), 
available at <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name= 
ViewWeb&articleId=12350> (last visited Jan 20, 2007) (assessing the 2006 election results and con-
cluding that Latinos have nuanced views with respect to immigration and that the Latino population in 
the United States is diverse linguistically, culturally, and politically). 
 59 See Waters and Jiménez, 31 Ann Rev Sociol at 107 (cited in note 20) (noting that though the 
regional concentration of immigration is inescapable, a statistically significant number of immigrants 
have been bypassing the traditional gateway cities and states and settling in suburban and rural com-
munities, as well as in states that, historically, have not received much immigration). 
 60 Traditional gateway states include California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois. See Alba 
and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream at 9 (cited in note 29). 
 61 See Waters and Jiménez, 31 Ann Rev Sociol at 107 (cited in note 20). 
 62 See Paula D. McClain, North Carolina’s Response to Latino Immigrants and Immigration, in 
Greg Anrig, Jr. and Tova Andrea Wang, eds, Immigration’s New Frontiers: Experiences from the 
Emerging Gateway States 7 (Century Foundation 2006). 
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grants.63 This openness eventually gives way to more restrictive measures, 
such as denying immigrants access to public benefits.64 Today’s status quo 
in most of these states is characterized by ambivalence, particularly when it 
comes to the growth of the undocumented population. Policymakers en-
gage in regular efforts to reconcile the commitment to accommodation with 
the trepidation felt by existing residents because of their (often inaccurate) 
perception that their communities are becoming unrecognizable and even 
dangerous due to immigration. 
The proliferation in the last year of local government ordinances that 
would prohibit landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants or 
deny city contracts to employers who hire undocumented workers repre-
sents another significant data point in the discussion of receiving-society 
adaptation.65 These ordinances are overtly addressed to the specific prob-
lem of illegal immigration, but they arguably represent part of a larger 
struggle to adapt to and resist immigration more generally—a form of re-
sistance to demographic change. Indeed, the fact that many of the ordi-
nances passed include official English declarations, which in addition to 
proclaiming the need for commonality also claim that “in today’s modern 
society, [the city] may also need to protect and preserve the rights of those 
who speak only the English language,”66 suggests that the concern is not 
exclusively over immigration of the illegal variety. Whether the issue is 
day laborers congregating on street corners, the perception of overburdened 
public hospitals, or the dramatic rise of non-English-speaking students in 
the local schools, local communities are reaching for ways to handle what 
many people perceive to be threats to their ways of life. In the same way 
that immigrants often seek to insulate themselves from the challenges of 
life in a new society by relying on networks of co-ethnics, residents of 
places newly exposed to immigration strive to insulate themselves from 
changes they find overwhelming. 
This cycle of acceptance, followed by restriction, and culminating in 
ambivalence, is of course not an innovation of the new immigration states. 
Traditional gateway states and the federal government cycle through these 
same stages, with measures like Proposition 187 in California and Con-
  
 63 See Greg Anrig, Jr. and Tova Andrea Wang, Introduction, in Greg Anrig, Jr. and Tova Wang, 
eds, Immigration’s New Frontier: Experiences from the Emerging Gateway States 2 (Century Founda-
tion 2006). 
 64 Id. In another work, I explore the critical role that state and local governments play in the proc-
ess of immigrant integration and argue that a coherent immigration system requires state and local 
participation in immigration matters. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Mich L Rev (forthcoming 2008). 
 65 The Fair Immigration Reform Movement has compiled a representative list of the local ordi-
nances passed, as well as those defeated, since the movement began in San Bernardino, California, 
whose City Council ultimately blocked the ordinance. FIRM’s documentation of the ordinances is 
available at <http://www.immigrationsolidarity.org/ 
Documents/Nov06OverviewLocalOrdinances/> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). 
 66 See City of Hazelton, Official English Ordinance 2006-19, available at 
<http://www.hazletoncity.org/home_frameset.htm> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). 
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gress’s 1996 immigration overhaul representing the most recent peak of 
restriction.67 The examples of local ambivalence and resistance in the new 
immigration states simply underscore that discussions about how best to 
ensure immigrant incorporation must include consideration of the mecha-
nisms and attitudes the receiving society adopts to deal with immigration—
of the coping mechanisms, so to speak. 
Many of these coping mechanisms seriously complicate the lives of 
immigrants. Today’s local ordinances, the 1996 welfare reforms that de-
nied immigrants access to a range of public benefits,68 and drives to ban 
bilingual education or declare English the official language69 all reflect 
resistance to immigration and immigrant presence in some way. Whether 
or not these measures are preempted or constitutionally prohibited, and 
whether or not they express legitimate concerns, they stand in the way of 
incorporation—some more obviously than others.70 Measures designed to 
limit immigrants’ choices, to cut back on programs designed to assist im-
migrants, to exclude immigrants from participating in generally available 
programs and generally open institutions, or to define belonging in terms 
that exclude immigrants because of language or other cultural differences, 
conspire to make incorporation difficult. Again, some of these restrictions 
  
 67 Law of Nov 8, 1994, 1994 Calif Legis Serv Prop 187 (nullified by injunction); IIRIRA Pub L 
No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546 (1996), codified at 8 USC §§ 1101 note et seq and 5 USC § 552 note 
(1996). 
 68 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
significantly limited immigrant eligibility for various means tested benefits programs. See Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 
(1996), codified in scattered sections of 8, 26, and 42 USC. 
 69 For a discussion of these initiatives, see Rodríguez, 94 Cal L Rev at 751–54, 759–65 (cited in 
note 28). 
 70 Denying immigrants access to public benefits arguably impedes economic advancement by 
removing temporary safety nets, as well as longer term forms of insurance, such as health care coverage 
for adults and children alike. Though no court has ever found a right to bilingual education, and as it 
has been implemented, bilingual education has produced mixed results, the social science evidence 
largely suggests that well designed bilingual education programs are more effective at promoting lan-
guage and other achievement among students than English immersion programs. See H.D. Adamson, 
Language Minority Students in American Schools: An Education In English 231–32 (Lawrence Erl-
baum 2005) (citing research showing that well-run bilingual programs are effective, but that not all 
bilingual programs are well-run); Robert E. Slavin and Alan Cheung, A Synthesis of Research on Lan-
guage of Reading Instruction for English Language Learners, 75 Rev of Educ Rsrch 247, 273 (2005) 
(reviewing seventeen studies of various language programs, twelve of which found positive effects of 
bilingual education and none of which found results favoring English immersion); Wayne P. Thomas 
and Virginia P. Collier, A National Study of Effectiveness for Language Minority Students’ Long-Term 
Academic Achievement Executive Summary 7 (Center for Research on Education, Diversity and Excel-
lence 2003), available at <http://crede.berkeley.edu/research/llaa/1.1pdfs/ 
1.1_01es.pdf> (last visited Apr 3, 2007) (finding that bilingually schooled students outperformed com-
parably monolingually schooled students after four to seven years of dual language instruction). 
Though these studies are not unassailable, and though there is an absence of good data on the subject, 
this research suggests that the measures passed by states such as Massachusetts, California, and Ari-
zona that prohibit the use of native language in the instruction of English language learners sacrifices 
policy flexibility and rationality at the expense of immigrant children and in favor of an ideological 
agenda. For more detailed discussion of this issue, see Rodríguez, 94 Cal L Rev at 758–65 (cited in 
note 28). 
 5/11/2007 2:23:32 AM 
1] GUEST WORKERS AND INTEGRATION 25 
 
may be justified by cost concerns and political calculations, and some may 
be supported by legitimate ideological positions, but they nonetheless add 
friction to the process of assimilation. 
The emergence of these forms of adjustment to the perceived prob-
lems engendered by immigration ultimately force us from the descriptive to 
the normative—from assessing reaction to defining the degree of reciprocal 
adaptation required for immigrant incorporation to be successful. The sub-
sequent and inescapable normative inquiry revolves around determining 
which forms of adaptation facilitate the process of immigrant incorporation 
and which forms of adaptation work at cross purposes with the goal of in-
corporation. What type of reciprocity is required on the part of the receiv-
ing society? What forms of adjustment on the part of the receiving society 
actually facilitate the incorporation process? 
D. From Adaptation to Reciprocity 
In defining the term “reciprocity,” I should be clear that I intend to 
use it in two different senses. I first consider reciprocity in a narrow sense, 
addressing the policy realm, by focusing on the forms of adaptation by the 
receiving society that are required to ensure a peaceful process of immi-
grant assimilation—reciprocity as a mechanism of integration. The ques-
tion, under this definition of reciprocity, becomes what sorts of attitudes or 
practices adopted by the receiving society aid the process of assimilation. 
But I also intend reciprocity to have a broader meaning, based on the 
conceptions of social obligation and mutual cooperation that ought to char-
acterize a liberal society. The obligation to adopt immigration policies that 
promote the integration of immigrants represents the flipside of the obliga-
tion put on immigrants to adapt. This concept of reciprocity is, in a sense, a 
form of ideal theory. Though it is based on an appreciation of current 
demographic realities, its focus is on the ideal way of adapting to those 
realities. 
In taking this approach, I acknowledge that the U.S. has a long tradi-
tion of reciprocity failures or nativist reactions to new immigrant groups. 
Often the forms of adaptation adopted by Americans in response to immi-
gration have been coercive and exclusionary, as the preceding discussion 
makes clear. The classic work on American nativism remains John 
Higham’s Strangers in the Land,71 which is filled with examples of anti-
immigrant measures that have analogues today, though generally in less 
extreme form. Nativism as a form of host society adjustment thus may be 
inescapable, and it complicates the reciprocity question by introducing the 
dilemmas of politics into the equation. If there is an absence of political 
will to support an immigration policy that will promote integration, either 
because the public has temporarily rejected the goal of integration, or be-
  
 71 Higham, Strangers in the Land (cited in note 51). 
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cause it cannot see the connection between immigrant-friendly policies and 
long-term assimilation,72 then policymakers will be in a bind. On the one 
hand, the persistence of anti-immigrant anxiety should lead policymakers 
to attempt to counteract these tendencies as best they can, by trying to in-
ject rationality into the policy process and use immigration policy to en-
courage and obligate Americans to act reciprocally. At the same time, to 
prevent anti-immigrant backlash or to achieve a second best solution when 
perfect policies are not achievable, policymakers must sometimes com-
promise. 
Because I recognize the fickleness of Americans’ attitudes toward 
immigrants and immigration, I take two tacks in the remainder of this Arti-
cle. I first and foremost emphasize the sorts of reciprocity that will best 
facilitate integration, as well as the types of reciprocity we ought to ex-
hibit—factors I argue in Part II should lead us to reject temporary worker 
programs. But in a concession to the difficult politics of the immigration 
issue, I also consider in Part II how a guest worker program, as a second 
best solution, could be devised to meet the requirements of reciprocity as 
closely as possible, given current political constraints.73 
1. Reciprocity as a matter of policy. 
As I have noted, we must take large-scale immigration as a given and 
focus on what happens to immigrants and the host society alike as immi-
grants build new lives in the United States. By accepting that a certain 
amount of low-skilled Latin American immigration is inevitable for push 
and pull reasons, I begin from the same premise as those who champion 
guest worker programs, because those champions seek to channel what are 
now illegal forms of immigration through legal channels. Channeling this 
inevitable immigration through expanded legal mechanisms is certainly 
  
 72 The political climates that produced Proposition 187 and the 1996 immigration and welfare 
reforms could be said to reflect both circumstances. 
 73 For a similar approach, see Howard F. Chang, Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration 
Restrictions as Employment Discrimination, 78 Chi Kent L Rev 291 (2003). Chang observes that guest 
worker policies are only second-best policies from the perspective of principles of liberal justice, but 
that they represent an improvement over the status quo and are an acceptable compromise in a world in 
which Americans appear unwilling to bear the burdens that more liberal policies would impose. Id at 
294–95. Chang takes the position that liberal ideals of equality require us to treat all individuals with 
equal concern, which makes our immigration restrictions difficult to justify and tantamount to a form of 
employment discrimination, given that the restrictions prevent would-be immigrants from accessing 
jobs in the U.S. economy on the basis of immutable characteristics. Id at 295–303. He concedes, how-
ever, that “[t]he self-interest of natives . . . is bound to impose constraints of political feasibility on the 
availability of immigrant visas,” and that “[a]s long as natives are limited in their willingness to bear 
fiscal burdens, they are likely to restrict alien access to permanent residence.” Id at 322. The resulting 
restrictions “would likely exclude many unskilled aliens from the U.S. labor market unless they are 
willing to immigrate illegally or have access to guest worker visas.” Change, 78 Chi Kent L Rev at 322. 
Given these political constraints, guest worker programs “may represent the only alternative to illegal 
immigration for aliens otherwise excluded from the U.S. labor market”, and therefore these programs 
would enhance the welfare of natives and immigrants alike, compared to the “politically feasible alter-
natives.” Id at 323. 
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preferable to the status quo. It is also preferable to a policy posture that 
places unrealistic faith in new technology’s ability to seal the border and 
then attempts to manage subsequent crises of illegal immigration through 
post-hoc legalization efforts. But then critical questions arise: what legal 
mechanisms should we devise? Through what forms of adjustment should 
the receiving society facilitate the incorporation of these inevitable immi-
grants? The design of these legal mechanisms—an issue I consider in detail 
in Part II—is crucial. 
As a general matter, reciprocity requires a willingness to assist as well 
as a willingness to adapt. Willingness to assist might take the form of a 
commitment to providing translation and interpretation services in the pub-
lic and private sectors in order to make institutional bureaucracies and so-
cial institutions navigable to non–English-speaking immigrants. The will-
ingness to devote resources to such services acknowledges that the process 
of learning English takes time, but it also reflects what might seem coun-
terintuitive: translation and interpretation are mechanisms of integration. 
They build immigrants’ trust in and understanding of the public sphere, and 
they help immigrants develop social and cultural capital in the form of 
knowledge of the system—capital that need not depend on an ability to 
speak English. Willingness to assist might take the shape of making public 
programs available to citizens also available to immigrants, reversing the 
spirit of the 1996 immigration reforms. Finally, willingness to assist might 
also include indicating openness to immigrants as political actors, by grant-
ing them voting rights, perhaps initially in local elections, or by responding 
to their political manifestations, such as the spring 2006 demonstrations, as 
we would respond to the political mobilizations of fellow citizens—not 
with incredulousness, but with recognition of the legitimacy of their con-
cerns and a willingness to consider them in policy debates. 
The meaning of willingness to adapt is more elusive. At bottom it re-
quires openness to change, even when that change disrupts one’s environ-
ment. Signs of adaptation might include liberal views toward future immi-
gration, a public discourse that focuses less on sealing the border than on 
practical responses to demographic changes, or more widespread public 
recognition of the net benefits that immigration generates for the United 
States and the hemisphere as a whole. 
In the context of the current debate, willingness to adapt should trans-
late into willingness to substantially increase the number of unskilled im-
migrants permitted to enter legally—another assumption I share with those 
who support guest worker programs. This type of adaptation reflects the 
realization that we cannot enforce our way out of the illegal immigration 
problem—either because increased enforcement is unlikely to succeed in 
suppressing the market forces at work, or because the cost of optimal en-
forcement is too high, given that immigration produces economic benefits 
to the country. 
 5/11/2007 2:23:32 AM 
28 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2007 
 
In fact, as I already have suggested, to fail to adapt in this way would 
be to perpetuate the status quo of high levels of undocumented immigra-
tion—a circumstance that would substantially impede immigrant assimila-
tion. Undocumented status, which really means the absence of legal status, 
impedes integration because of the obvious constraints it places on the in-
dividual immigrant and his family from operating as fully functional mem-
bers of society. Moreover, the presence of a large undocumented popula-
tion erodes public support for immigration and prompts the adoption of 
restrictions that often affect legal immigrants and their co-ethnic citizens.74 
The equation of immigration with lawlessness creates trepidation regarding 
immigration. While it is difficult to isolate the extent to which the current 
batch of restrictive proposals at the federal, state, and local levels are a 
response to the mushrooming of the undocumented population, as opposed 
to more general ambivalence about immigration itself, neutralizing the 
discourse of illegality would certainly help soften attitudes toward immi-
gration.75 
Finally, willingness to adapt includes openness to the possibility that 
American culture will come to resemble immigrant culture. This openness 
might include adopting some of the customs of immigrant groups (forms of 
celebration, holiday observances, or cuisine), or targeting media, enter-
tainment, advertising, and consumer products to immigrant preferences. 
More significant signs of adaptation would entail open as opposed to 
closed attitudes toward language difference—rules that accept linguistic 
pluralism in certain settings, such as in the workplace or in public spaces, 
rather than rules that prohibit the speaking of non-English, or attempts to 
drive languages other than English out of the public sphere.76 In its most 
developed form, this kind of adaptation would include willingness on the 
part of native English speakers to learn Spanish or other widely spoken 
languages. It also would involve acceptance by the white population of its 
status as one of many ethnic groups, as opposed to the dominant ethnic 
group. Whites would have to accept the status, in certain parts of the coun-
try, as a minority.77 
  
 74 See, for example, Yvonne Abraham, Denied licenses, legal immigrants sue state Registry, 
Boston Globe A1 (Dec 15, 2006) (reporting on the filing of a class-action lawsuit claiming that em-
ployees of the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, in their efforts to ensure that undocumented 
immigrants are not issued drivers licenses, are denying lawful immigrants licenses); Press release by 
MALDEF, LULAC, NCLR, NALEO, National Latino Organizations Express Concern about Recent 
Immigration Raids (Dec 21, 2006), available at <http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/43451/> (last 
visited Jan 20, 2007) (condemning the December raids by ICE of the Swift meat packing plants for, 
among other things, racial profiling and targeting of lawful permanent residents). 
 75 Support for a guest worker program might seem, at first glance, to be precisely the sort of 
adaptation I am suggesting. But though a temporary worker program would be preferable to the status 
quo, for reasons I explore at length in Part II, it is not the form of adaptation policymakers should 
adopt. 
 76 I have discussed the English-only workplace rule as a sign of reluctance to adapt at length in 
Rodríguez, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1689 (cited in note 47). 
 77 See Myers, Immigrants and Boomers at 38 (cited in note 23) (considering California, where 
 
 5/11/2007 2:23:32 AM 
1] GUEST WORKERS AND INTEGRATION 29 
 
Our history is full of examples of these sorts of adaptations, just as it 
is full of instances of restrictions like the local ordinances currently being 
debated. The point of exploring the meaning of willingness to assist and 
adapt is not to suggest that these forms of adaptation would require a 
wholesale rethinking of our responses to immigration, nor that all immi-
grant admissions policies must bear these hallmarks. Rather, this discus-
sion highlights the attitudes and tendencies we should foster when debating 
how to rework our immigration policy to respond to changing pressures on 
our borders. 
2. Reciprocity as obligation. 
As I have framed them thus far, questions of reciprocity are first and 
foremost matters of policy. But these complex policy questions are not 
wholly separable from the discrete and equally difficult questions of moral 
and political obligation. Adaptation by the host society, in addition to fa-
cilitating assimilation by reducing the friction that the arrival of new immi-
grants inevitably produces, is also arguably required as a matter of obliga-
tion—a point emphasized by the 1997 Commission on Immigration Re-
form, which employed the language of obligation to describe the responsi-
bilities of both immigrants and the receiving society.78 Even if a guest 
worker program serves the function of reducing illegal immigration, or is 
reasonably conducive to integration, it might not meet the demands of po-
litical fairness or justice. 
But from where does the obligation to integrate immigrants come, and 
what is its scope? Political theorists have given sustained attention to the 
rights nation-states possess to exclude immigrants, as well as to the obliga-
tions nation-states have to admit certain types of migrants, namely refu-
gees.79 But little consideration has been given to the extent to which 
Americans might have obligations to integrate not only the immigrants 
Congress admits, but also those who have crossed and will continue to 
cross our borders illegally. Indeed, much of the discussion of immigration 
and justice accepts the assumption that we have the ability to control who 
enters the United States and to shape the body politic according to stan-
dards that conform to conceptions of justice, or to conceptions of who we 
want in our society. 
A number of political philosophers, in addressing the phenomenon of 
globalization and the rise of international systems and institutions, have 
  
whites are no longer a majority of the population, as a “bellwether state” that should motivate Ameri-
cans to consider immigrant integration as an investment in the country’s future). 
 78 See United States Commission on Immigration Reform Report to Congress, Becoming an 
American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy 28 (1997). 
 79 For a series of essays on this topic, see Warren F. Schwartz, ed, Justice in Immigration (Cam-
bridge 1995). See also Michael Blake, Discretionary Immigration, 30 Philosophical Topics 273, 273 
(2002) (defining discretionary immigration as “immigration . . . wherein the decision to admit the 
prospective immigrant is not itself demanded by liberal morality”). 
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made the claim that institutional relationships beyond those set up by the 
nation-state connect individuals of different citizenships to one another, 
imposing obligations of justice on their relationships. As Iris Marion 
Young has explained in her analysis of the anti-sweatshop movement, 
these theorists posit that  
reciprocal obligations of justice obtain between most if not all 
[people,] not simply because they are human nor because they live 
under the same political constitution, but because they all depend 
to some degree on schemes of social cooperation which they pre-
suppose in making their own plans or to which they contribute by 
their actions.80 
It is, of course, difficult to pinpoint individual responsibility for these 
large-scale relationships, particularly when individuals do not represent the 
primary cause of these relationships,81 but the fact of general social par-
ticipation in these interdependent structures supports the notion that mem-
bers of societies have obligations to one another by virtue of this participa-
tion. 
How far these obligations extend, of course, is the difficult question. 
The answer must turn on the nature of the relationship under consideration. 
My claim here is that the case for interconnectedness giving rise to obliga-
tion is stronger and easier to define in the context of immigration than 
within a more general and amorphous framework of global justice. Be-
cause of conditions of interdependence, we can speak of our relationship to 
immigrants in the language of political obligation, whether those immi-
grants are here in compliance with the terms set out by Congress or in vio-
lation of them. 
The circumstances of immigration only heighten the salience of this 
interdependency argument and make the scope of the obligation somewhat 
easier to discern. As Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut demonstrate, 
Mexican migration to the U.S. in particular is the result not of “individual 
calculations of gain,” but of “forces buried deep in the history of the rela-
tionships between both nations.”82 Those forces are, of course, economic, 
and have been accelerated by the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
resulting in Mexico becoming “the real labor reservoir for the American 
  
 80 See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility & Global Labor Justice, 12 J of Pol Phil 365, 373 
(2004). 
 81 See Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in 
Liberal Thought 39 (Oxford 2001) (“[W]hen an outcome is the joint result of the actions of a number of 
people, including ourselves, we tend to see our own agency as implicated to a much lesser extent than 
we do when we take an effect to have resulted solely from our own actions.”). 
 82 See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 352 (cited in note 21). See also Massey, 
Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1500 (cited in note 21) (describing the self-perpetuating 
character of migration networks). 
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economy.”83 But they are also the result of a history of contact and coloni-
zation between the two societies.84 The upshot of these observations is that 
migration, particularly from Mexico and Latin America, is the product not 
only of our own current economic needs and choices, but also of the eco-
nomic and foreign policy choices that preceded us. In other words, immi-
gration to the United States is the function of choices of which we as a 
society are the authors. These choices have given rise to an interdepend-
ence not only with immigrants who have already arrived, but also with 
future immigrants, which in turn requires us to recognize certain reciprocal 
obligations that arise from our associations with others, regardless of bor-
ders. 
But what is the content of those reciprocal obligations? Why is the ob-
ligation not fulfilled in the form of foreign aid or through fair trade poli-
cies? This obligation must be reflected in our immigration policy, for the 
simple reason that our interdependence with Latin America does not just 
produce certain conditions abroad, it has given rise to and will continue to 
give rise to populations of actual people within our borders. In other words, 
the consequences of our interdependence are intimate and immediate and 
result in person-to-person relationships that are not simply abstract, as in 
the context of globalization, but physical and real. That this interdepend-
ence has produced in-person forms of association creates an obligation and 
need for social cooperation in the context of American society, which in 
turn should translate into an obligation to share spaces and institutions—
both social and political. 
The fact that much immigrant presence today is unauthorized by our 
law does not undermine these points. Indeed, the interdependence that ex-
ists as a matter of fact, despite the absence of legal sanction, simply under-
scores that interdependence is the product of decentralized choices by mar-
ket participants and family and social networks, not just the product of 
decisions by a centralized sovereign. The significance of immigrants’ pres-
ence as the result of our interdependence is only heightened by the jus soli 
rule of citizenship; their presence means that children born while they are 
here, as a matter of constitutional right, belong to our political community, 
tightening the associative connections between U.S. citizens and the people 
from other societies with whom we associate through immigration. 
This interdependence, resulting in physical and social interconnected-
ness on U.S. soil, provides the strongest basis to support an obligation to 
incorporate immigrants, but the obligation to integrate current and would-
be immigrants might also come from the fact that Americans generally 
  
 83 Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 352 (cited in note 21) (“[B]y reason of size, geo-
graphic proximity, and history, Mexico has become the real labor reservoir of the American econ-
omy.”). 
 84 Id at 353. 
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benefit from immigration.85 The obligation could stem from the fact that 
we choose neither where we are born, nor into what station we are born, 
and we therefore have no inherent entitlement to restrict movement be-
tween social strata and locales. Certainly the obligation lies somewhere 
between the obligations we owe to our compatriots and our cosmopolitan 
duties to others throughout the world.86 
Ultimately, the obligation to integrate is based on a necessary expan-
sion of the political community beyond the community of U.S. citizens and 
those admitted for lawful permanent residence to those with whom, 
through the ebb and flow of migration, we will predictably and consistently 
associate—not only in the sense of hemispheric economic interdependence, 
but through the quotidian person-to-person contacts that this interdepend-
ence produces—relationships that will arise with or without legal sanction. 
Those who fall into this category are not truly strangers, and the citi-
zen/stranger dichotomy on which many existing theories of mutual obliga-
tion depend does not fully address the state of affairs implicated in today’s 
immigration debate. 
For a variety of reasons, it is vital that this question of obligation in-
form our immigration policy debates and that it do so with reference to 
specific forms of interdependency, as the nature of obligation will change 
depending on the nature of the relationship under examination. First, im-
migration policy, by exerting control over the migration of people into the 
United States, implicates the United States as a sovereign entity and there-
fore implicates not only the interests of U.S. citizens and residents and their 
domestic labor needs, but also the proper role of the United States in the 
world and the interests of other sovereigns and their people. As such, im-
migration policy should be informed by the obligations owed by the United 
States and its people to the world beyond its borders—particularly to the 
  
 85 There is an active debate among economists about whether and the extent to which the United 
States benefits from immigration. There appears to be a strong consensus that the economy as a whole 
benefits but that the costs are largely born by low-wage American workers with limited education. 
These redistributive consequences should not be dismissed, but they are limited and arguably better 
dealt with through more direct forms of intervention and training than immigration restrictions. For a 
discussion of this literature, see generally Chang, 78 Chi Kent L Rev at 305–16 (cited in note 73); 
Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, NY Times Mag (July 7, 2006). It is also worth pointing 
out that the interests of these low-wage workers are least well served by the existing system of un-
documented immigration and would likely be best served by a system that admitted low-skilled work-
ers for permanent residence, because those workers would have the strongest incentives and greatest 
freedom to advocate for higher labor standards. 
 86 For a discussion of the concept of mutual aid owed to strangers, see Walzer, Spheres of Justice 
at 33 (cited in note 17). See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 114 (Belknap 1971). For a discussion 
of the duties we owe strangers from a cosmopolitan perspective, see generally Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Belknap 2006) (articulating a theory 
of justice that assures that all people are able to realize what she calls “human capabilities”); Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge 2000); Noah 
Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law, 116 Yale L J 1022 (2007) (discussing recent efforts by Martha Nussbaum 
and Kwame Anthony Appiah to make theories of cosmopolitanism useful to political theory discus-
sions). 
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extent that the world crosses our borders. Second, it is critical to effective 
self-government that our basic treatment of participants in our political 
community be animated by an appropriate and considered appreciation of 
the obligations we owe to others, including those who are not citizens and 
those who have not yet secured the right to remain in the United States. 
Finally, theoretical debates concerning questions of global justice require 
an appreciation of how members of one nation-state might be bound to 
other actors that circulate within their sphere of influence but yet remain 
outside formal definitions of citizenship. 
Deciding how far to extend this conception of political community 
will certainly be difficult; populations of migrants will shade into a global 
population to which the United States might owe obligations as matters of 
cosmopolitan concern or global justice—obligations necessarily different 
than those owed fellow citizens. This idea of obligation to integrate also 
intersects with myriad debates about open borders versus immigration con-
trol,87 the nature of membership in a polity, and theories of global jus-
tice,88 and therefore, my discussion here has only scratched the surface. In 
Part II, I explore why guest worker policies do not adequately respect the 
imperatives I have just outlined, but the full parameters of our obligation to 
integrate and adapt will necessarily be a subject for future work. 
II. GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS AND THE THREAT TO IMMIGRANT 
INCORPORATION 
At first glance, guest worker programs appear to be designed in the 
pragmatic spirit I advocate in Part I. By channeling what would otherwise 
be illegal immigration through legal channels, a guest worker program 
would deal with the illegality factor currently poisoning public opinion on 
immigration, but in a way that promises little long-term change. Also, by 
promising to provide guest workers with labor protections, the policy 
makes a legal commitment to improving the status of otherwise vulnerable 
individuals, thereby undercutting the depressive effects of illegal labor on 
wages. 
Guest worker programs are also consistent with contemporary trends 
in immigration policy toward the use of temporary visas. In 2004, only 38 
percent of lawful permanent residents had arrived initially on permanent 
visas or as refugees or asylees—statuses that convert automatically to per-
manent residence—a figure down from the 60 percent level between 1998 
  
 87 Compare Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 Rev of Polit 
251, 251–52 (1987) (arguing that Rawlsian, Nozickian, and utilitarian theory all support a concept of 
open borders, which reflects the deep commitment of liberal societies to respect all people as free and 
equal) with Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39–41, 60 (cited in note 17). 
 88 See Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Philosophy & Pub Aff 113, 129–30 
(2005); Blake, 30 Philosophical Topics 273 (cited in note 79). 
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and 1999.89 Indeed, the allure of the temporary worker has exerted a strong 
pull on labor-based admissions in particular. Today, more of our labor 
needs are filled by workers on temporary visas than by lawful permanent 
residents (“LPRs”). According to the Migration Policy Institute, in fiscal 
year 2004, the United States admitted nearly 1.5 million temporary work-
ers, trainees, and their dependents, but only 155,330 new LPRs through the 
employment-based admissions categories.90 In addition, a number of 
small-scale guest worker programs have long existed in the agricultural 
sector.91 
The fact that our system is coming to look increasingly like the Ger-
man model, under which no one is initially admitted for permanent resi-
dency, should give us pause, given the difficulties German society has had 
integrating its immigrant populations, at least relative to the United 
States.92 And a few distinctive features of the phenomenon that has in-
spired guest worker proposals should make us particularly skeptical of ac-
celerating the trend toward the temporary. First, the problem of illegal im-
migration to which a guest worker program is being proposed as a solution 
is enormous in scale and cross-cutting in scope. The undocumented popu-
lation has reached at least 11.5 million people, and an average of 500,000 
new undocumented immigrants have arrived each year since 2000.93 
Unlike existing programs in the agricultural sector, the new guest worker 
proposals would cut across sectors of the economy, making the programs 
more unwieldy and less susceptible to the cyclical rhythms that character-
ize harvesting cycles. What is more, the increasing flow of undocumented 
immigrants is not simply the result of labor market demands, but also the 
  
 89 See Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship 
in the United States 141 (Oxford 2006). (“[t]he number of noncitizens who came as lawful immigrants 
or in an asylum or refugee status that converts automatically to permanent residence . . . decreased . . . 
from 66 percent in the two-year period 1998–99 to 38 percent in 2004.”) Therefore the 38 percent 
figure includes people who arrived on permanent visas and also the asylum/refugee numbers. 
 90 See Deborah Waller Meyers, Temporary Worker Programs: A Patchwork Policy Response 3 
(Migration Policy Institute January 2006) available at 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFI_12_Meyers.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). Note that 
only 5,000 LPR visas are available per year in the employment categories for unskilled workers and 
workers with the equivalent of a bachelor of arts degree. See 8 USC § 1153(b)(3)(B) (establishing that 
no more than 10,000 visas can be made available to unskilled workers per year); Nicaraguan Adjust-
ment and Central American Relief Act, Pub L 105-100, 111 Stat 2160 (1997) (allocating 5,000 LPR 
visas from the 10,000 available to unskilled workers to beneficiaries of NACARA) see also Aleinikoff, 
Martin, and Motomura, Immigration and Citizenship at 281, n 3 (cited in note 37) (noting that the 
number of LPR visas for unskilled workers will likely be 5,000 for decades to come, in light of the 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act). 
 91 For detailed discussion of these programs, see Philip Martin, Manolo Abella, and Christiane 
Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-first Century 94–98, 105–10 (Yale 2006). 
 92 See Motomura, 59 Stan L Rev at 869–70 (cited in note 26). 
 93 See Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population in the United States 
at i (cited in note 1). See also Office of Immigration Statistics, US Dept of Homeland Security, 2005 
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2006), available at 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf> (last visited 
Jan 20, 2007) (presenting various immigration statistics). 
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result of network effects discussed in Part I and the strong impulse to join 
family already in the United States.94 The ambition behind the programs is 
thus substantial, and the impact of failure on public opinion and on the 
immigration system as a whole would be correspondingly significant. 
Second, in contrast to the current flow of temporary visa holders who 
come from all over the world and from across the economic spectrum, the 
phenomenon that a guest worker program is meant to address comes pre-
dominantly from Mexico and Latin America95 in the form of unskilled 
workers. This concentration compounds the danger that a temporary pro-
gram would create a separable and identifiable caste96 of workers with 
limited social capital stemming from their low-skilled status, limited par-
ticipation rights, and tenuous purchase on public policy debates, all of 
which would be reinforced by their temporary presence, even assuming 
standard labor protections apply.97 It is not insignificant that this class of 
workers would bear national origins, ethnicities, and cultural characteristics 
with which the United States and Americans already have a complex rela-
tionship of antagonism and discrimination. 
In assessing the relationship between guest worker programs and im-
migrant mobility, it is important to note that guest worker programs could 
take one of two general forms. Most programs are designed to recruit for-
eign workers to meet temporary labor market demands and then rotate 
those workers out of the visa programs, and out of the country, once the 
labor market or political climate has changed. But a guest worker program 
also could include a path to permanent residence and then citizenship for 
those workers who meet certain qualifications. In this section, I assess the 
  
 94 These family members inside the U.S. may be unable to petition for their relatives to enter 
because of their undocumented status or the considerable backlogs in the family preference categories, 
which are particularly severe for people seeking entry from Mexico and may be preventing legal family 
reunification, thus giving rise to illegal migration. See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 18 
(cited in note 21) (noting that “[o]nce migrant networks have consolidated, they can become suffi-
ciently powerful to sustain the movement in the absence of the original economic incentives”). 
 95 The Pew Hispanic Center has estimated that 78 percent of the current undocumented population 
has come from Mexico and the rest of Latin America—56 percent from the former and 22 percent from 
the latter. See Passel, Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population in the United States at 
i–ii (cited in note 1). 
 96 Or, in the terms of Carolene Products footnote 4, a discrete and insular minority. United States 
v Carolene Products, 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938). 
 97 In his critique of guest worker programs, Michael Walzer relies on a similar distinction between 
the migrants likely to become guest workers, and those who migrate temporarily on other sorts of 
visas—the university professor or high tech engineer who might come as a provisional worker through 
a so-called nonimmigrant visa. Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 60 (cited in note 17). His argument, which 
I discuss in more detail in Part II B, is that all people who live and work in a society should have equal 
right to participate in it. Id. The obvious response to this claim is that surely the “technical advisor” or 
the “visiting university professor” would not qualify for such status. Walzer concludes that these tem-
porary workers are “not very important,” because “it is in the nature of their privileged positions that 
they are able to call upon the protection of their home states if they ever need it.” Id. This response is 
not wholly satisfactory, but there is something significant to the idea that the constraints of a temporary 
visa do not inhibit the mobility of a high-tech or academically elite immigrant in the same way that they 
constrain the options of an unskilled laborer, both because of the nature of their respective employers, 
and because of the fact that they are likely to be received in different ways by the host society. 
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mobility and reciprocity questions assuming that a guest worker program 
would take the former shape. I then consider the viability of a guest worker 
program with a path to permanent residence as a second-best option. 
Guest worker programs, under the strictly temporary model, are likely 
to include several basic design features. Visas would authorize migrants to 
work for limited periods of time; recent proposals set the limit at two to 
three years.98 Most current proposals also would permit guest workers to 
renew their visas once, resulting in a maximum stay of four to six years. 
Some proposals would require workers to return home to renew their vi-
sas.99 
Most existing proposals would tie the issuance of a visa to particular 
employers, some of whom might be pre-screened as participants in the 
program, others of whom will be required to go through a bureaucratic 
labor certification process once they have identified particular workers they 
would like to hire.100 
The crucial question then becomes one of portability: can a worker 
who loses his job or who would prefer alternative employment, perhaps in 
a different industry or in a different city or state, carry his work authoriza-
tion with him? In the event of job loss, most visa programs would grant the 
worker a certain number of days to find new employment, but under most 
program formulations, the new employer must also be officially certified to 
participate in the program.101 In other words, unlike lawful permanent 
residents, a guest worker, even under a portability regime, would not have 
complete freedom to move in the economy. Finally, some guest worker 
programs would permit a visa holder to bring his or her spouse and de-
pendents to the United States, but none of the programs currently proposed 
would permit the spouse to work.102 
A. Guest Workers and Immigrant Mobility 
As I argue in the sections that follow, strictly temporary guest worker 
programs are not conducive to immigrant mobility along any of the dimen-
sions outlined in Part I. The constraints on immigrant mobility will vary, 
however, depending on the immigrant’s intent. Two types of migrants are 
  
 98 See, for example, Talking Nonsense, Wash Post at A14 (cited in note 13) (discussing President 
Bush’s latest proposal to limit guest worker visas to six years total and require visa holders to leave the 
country every two years for six months at a time). See also Migration Information Source, Side-by-Side 
Chart for Major Immigration Legislation Pending in 109th Congress (listing the visa terms for various 
bills), available at <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/legislation_jan06.pdf> (last visited June 
23, 2007). 
 99 See Migration Information Source, Side-by-Side Chart (cited in note 98). 
 100 See id. The specifics of this process obviously depend on legislative design, but a guest worker 
program is likely to require that an employer engage in a period of recruitment of U.S. workers, make a 
commitment to pay the prevailing wage, and to abide by basic labor law protections. 
 101 See, for example, id. 
 102 See, for example, id. 
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at issue. Guest worker programs constrain the mobility of what I call tem-
porary workers with temporary intent, or the mobility of workers who may 
intend to return to their countries of origin, but who may well spend ex-
tended periods of time in the United States. Temporary programs also 
thwart the mobility of those migrants whose ultimate desire is a more per-
manent form of residence in the United States—temporary workers with 
permanent intent. I consider each in turn. 
1. Temporary migrants with temporary intent. 
Up to this point, I have defined immigrant mobility as mobility within 
the context of American life. This formulation of mobility amounts to the 
ability to take advantage of opportunities inside the United States and to 
acquire the social capital necessary for integration into American institu-
tions. But another way of conceptualizing immigrant mobility is in terms of 
freedom to move across the border or to live a transnational life by partici-
pating in two different societies, with different allegiances to either side of 
the border. Guest worker programs are conceptually consistent with a 
growing appreciation among scholars of the cyclical nature of migration. 
They are also consistent with the desire of policymakers on both sides of 
the border to facilitate the temporary migration that serves the labor needs 
of the United States, the development needs of Mexico,103 and the individ-
ual and familial needs of the migrants themselves.104 Indeed, many mi-
grants who travel to the United States, particularly those who enter through 
unlawful channels, initially intend to stay for only a brief period. Their 
migration is motivated by a number of factors, including the desire to sup-
port a family, to make major purchases or finance home construction, or to 
fund small business ventures in the home country—all projects difficult to 
commence in a low-wage society that lacks credit and insurance struc-
tures.105 These migrants follow preexisting migration networks, so their 
  
 103 A guest worker program would, for example, serve the development needs of Mexico and other 
countries heavily dependent on remittances sent by their citizens from the United States. Remittances to 
Latin America from the United States were expected to reach $45 billion in 2006. Multilateral Invest-
ment Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, Sending Money Home (cited in note 5). The continua-
tion of this flow depends on migrants’ retaining a strong attachment to their home countries, namely 
through the continued presence of their families there. This development strategy thus depends on 
temporary forms of migration that not only secure the flow of funds, but also ensure the return of a 
substantial portion of able-bodied citizens, rather than on permanent forms of migration that enable 
workers to move their families to the United States, thus weakening the connection to the home coun-
try. It is estimated that the total income for immigrants in the United States is about $500 billion. Id. 
Approximately 10 percent of these earnings is sent home as remittances, but more than 90 percent is 
spent in the local economies where immigrants reside. Id. 
 104 For an excellent example of scholarship exploring the possibility of facilitating transnational 
forms of citizenship and work, see Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S Cal L Rev 
503 (2007) (proposing a new way of structuring labor migration that links permission to enter the 
United States to membership in an international network of worker organizations through which mi-
grants would commit to refusing to work under conditions that violate labor laws). 
 105 See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 16–18 (cited in note 21). 
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actions might not match up perfectly with market dynamics. But their in-
tent to engage in va y ven (come and go) is clear at the outset of their mi-
gration. 
Perversely, as social scientists are increasingly uncovering, U.S. bor-
der enforcement policy is thwarting the cyclical nature of migration, mak-
ing it more difficult for people to return to their home countries.106 Ob-
servers and critics of increased border enforcement have emphasized that 
the amplification of enforcement at urban crossings, which began in the 
1980s and continued vigorously through the Clinton years and in the af-
termath of the attacks of September 11, has not only forced migrants to 
cross the border through treacherous desert terrain, but it also has essen-
tially trapped migrants inside the United States. Because the cost of cross-
ing the border has become so high, migrants who cross successfully are 
becoming less and less likely to return to their countries of origin after a 
brief stint in the U.S., opting instead for an extended presence, for fear that 
they will be unable to return in the future.107 In other words, heavy border 
enforcement appears to be interrupting what would otherwise be a natural 
coming and going of migrants, transforming it instead into a seemingly 
permanent or semi-permanent resettlement in the United States. 
There are at least two ways to think about how these findings should 
inform our immigration policy.108 On the one hand, we could think of 
strong border enforcement as a constant. In the current political climate, it 
  
 106 See Mireya Navarro, Traditional Round Trip for Workers Is Becoming a One-Way Migration 
North, NY Times A1 (Dec 21, 2006) (“Having run the gauntlet of enforcement resources at the border, 
migrants grew reluctant to repeat the experience and hunkered down to stay, causing rates of return 
migration to fall sharply.”) (quoting Princeton sociologist Douglas S. Massey). Navarro also notes that 
“[t]he 2005 census in Mexico counted 242,000 Mexicans who said they had lived in the United States 
and had returned to Mexico from 2000 to 2005,” and that, “[b]y comparison, a 1992 survey counted 
955,000 people who said they had returned in the previous five years.” Id. Also, “[t]he average prob-
ability of return for illegal immigrants was 47 percent during 1979–84 but fell to 27 percent during 
1997–2003.” See id, citing Massey. Other factors that have contributed to the decline in cyclical migra-
tion include immigrants’ increasing settlement in states far from the border, which makes return migra-
tion more costly and harder to effectuate, and immigrants’ increasing employment in jobs outside the 
agricultural sector, meaning they have more stable employment that is less subject to seasonal varia-
tions. See id. 
 107 See Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: 
Mexican Immigration in an Era of Free Trade 128–33 (Russell Sage 2002). Massey, Durand, and 
Malone note that by increasing the psychic and economic costs of border crossing, U.S. border en-
forcement policy has had the unintended effect of reducing return migration to Mexico. Id. See also 
Fernando Riosmena, Return Versus Settlement Among Undocumented Mexican Migrants, 1980 to 
1996, in Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey, eds, Crossing the Border: Research from the Mexican 
Migration Project 265, 278–79 (Russel Sage 2004) (noting the decline in return migration during the 
1990s caused by changes in U.S. immigration policy). 
 108 First, we might assume that tough border enforcement is one of the background conditions 
against which we should construct our policy. The current political climate—and the general political 
environment regarding matters of border enforcement—is unlikely to support a scaling down of border 
presence, and strong enforcement measures are arguably an inevitable trade-off that must be made to 
secure liberalization in other areas. If we take border enforcement as a given, facilitating cyclical mi-
gration becomes more difficult. To be sure, tough border measures could be passed alongside a guest 
worker program, but for reasons I discuss in more detail below, the interaction of guest worker pro-
grams with border enforcement may well produce a situation worse than the one we have now. 
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certainly seems unlikely that relaxation of border enforcement will emerge 
as a policy option. And support for stepped-up enforcement is likely to be 
the tradeoff for any policies that expand the number of legal immigrants in 
the United States, whether through earned legalization programs, guest 
worker programs, or a reevaluation of the caps on permanent admissions. 
With border enforcement held constant, a guest worker program may tem-
porarily reduce the undocumented population by creating additional legal 
mechanisms for crossing the border. But once the terms of the guest 
worker visas expire or a guest worker runs afoul of bureaucratic require-
ments, there is no reason to believe that the migrants who obtained the 
guest worker visas initially won’t behave in the same way as their counter-
parts who cross the border illegally, staying for long, albeit temporary, 
periods of time, whether with legal status or not. This phenomenon is more 
likely to occur if the guest worker visas made available are for short peri-
ods of time or do not include generous renewal provisions. In other words, 
a guest worker program will not necessarily foster cyclical migration if 
border enforcement makes re-crossings too costly. Guest worker programs 
will bring immigrants in with greater ease, but then border policies, along 
with other factors that make continued presence attractive, will trap those 
workers who have exhausted the temporary visa system but who have on-
going interest in remaining in the United States. 
But what if borders were more open, or easier to cross? Perhaps if the 
hemispheric labor market were permitted to operate without the constraints 
of border enforcement, we would see the flowering of the transnational 
lifestyle. If, in a world without strong border enforcement, more migrants 
would follow the cyclical migration patterns that benefit North and South, 
why not try to facilitate the cyclical nature of migration by providing guest 
workers visas that would enable legal crossings? 
Under this scenario, several types of migrants are likely to emerge. 
First, we might expect that some migrants’ needs will be served by a short 
sojourn in the United States, and for these migrants, a guest worker pro-
gram would ensure that those sojourns can be taken legally. Add to this 
possibility a world of relaxed border enforcement, and such migrants be-
come even more likely to return home, with the expectation that later visa-
less crossings might be feasible, should they become necessary. 
Second, there will be some guest workers who will take full advan-
tage of the temporary visa system, which will necessarily result in a long-
term (though perhaps not lifelong) stay. The reason is that for a guest 
worker program to be minimally effective at reducing undocumented im-
migration, it must permit migrants to work for a number years, it must in-
clude the possibility of visa renewal, and it should permit workers to bring 
their spouses and dependents, who are otherwise likely to attempt to cross 
the border as time passes to reunite with the breadwinner who made the 
initial crossing. Employers also will want some stability in their work-
forces. Many workers will apply for as many visa cycles as are made avail-
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able, and many will bring spouses and dependents with them, which is also 
likely to extend the length of time guest workers remain in the United 
States, because the imperative of family reunification in the country of 
origin will no longer exist. 
Assuming that migrants who take advantage of the full extent of the 
adopted guest worker program still opt to return home after two visa cy-
cles—say six years—they will still have been in the U.S. for a long period. 
As brief sojourns turn into years, the importance of incorporating these 
migrants into the body politic rises. The longer the semi-permanent pres-
ence, the more likely it is that these migrants will form interests whose 
defense requires access to social support networks and political processes. 
Moreover, the more time passes, the more migrants’ interests become inter-
twined with communities of lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens. 
As Douglas Massey has shown, as migrants “make repeated trips and ac-
cumulate more time abroad,” as they are joined by spouses and children in 
the workforce, and as they forge stronger links with particular employers, 
“a growing number of migrants and families settle in the host society.”109 
The longer a guest worker’s presence in the United States, the greater the 
possibility that U.S. citizen children will enter the picture, cementing per-
manent ties to the United States. Guest worker programs, even by their 
own temporary terms, are likely to create semi-permanent members. 
Given this very real possibility, we want to provide immigrant work-
ers with an incentive to invest in the society around them, even if their ul-
timate objective is to return home. All parties involved have an interest in 
ostensibly temporary workers behaving as good and effective social actors, 
even if their integration remains incomplete. No one has an interest in cre-
ating isolated cohorts with minimal connection to or investment in a world 
beyond their own personal interests. Preventing immigrant isolation re-
quires psychological as well as resource-based investment by migrants in 
the institutions and customs of the receiving society—precisely the sort of 
investment that makes being an immigrant less of a challenge for migrants 
themselves. 
To create the incentives for this level of regard, the society in which 
migrants are temporarily present must also be one in which they can mean-
ingfully participate. Individuals will be better social actors if they are both 
given the option of a permanent stake in society and expected to show the 
level of concern or regard for the well being of the receiving society that 
we should expect of full members. As Adam Cox and Eric Posner note in 
their discussion of the concept of country-specific investment, the uncer-
tainty caused by immigration policies, such as guest worker programs that 
treat immigrants as if they were on probation, delay an immigrant’s in-
vestment in society.110 Again, this may be precisely the motivation behind 
  
 109 See Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1502 (cited in note 21). 
 110 See Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 
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guest worker programs, but the result will be the presence for prolonged 
periods of time of isolated immigrant cohorts. Like Cox and Posner, my 
view is that “[a]ll else equal, it is generally better if the immigrant makes a 
country-specific investment than if she does not.”111 
Even for the migrants whose relocation interests remain temporary, 
then, our policies should be focused on creating incentives for social in-
vestment. At this stage, it is worth underscoring the instability of the so-
called transnational lifestyle. It may be that increasing numbers of migrants 
are forging a way of life that involves movement from society to society 
and maintenance of allegiances across borders.112 But even those with 
transnational lives maintain presences in actual communities for extended 
periods of time, and the importance of having an anchor in those communi-
ties, whether it be in the form of citizenship or self-created social networks, 
should not be discounted. One way to facilitate the development of the ties 
that anchor even the highly mobile migrant would be to present migrants 
with the possibility of permanent membership, or with the security that the 
United States is a society to which they can belong. Designing visa policy 
in this way may lead more immigrants to form a permanent intent to re-
main. But a policy that accepts this possibility upfront and attempts to pre-
vent the specter of a detached and isolated laboring class from arising is far 
preferable to a policy that encourages the creation and perpetuation of a 
laboring class with a minimal stake in the long-term prosperity of the soci-
ety in which they labor. 
2. Temporary migrants with permanent intent. 
Whether migrants set out with the intent to relocate permanently, 
many migrants develop the intent to remain in the United States. Again, 
guest worker programs are arguably designed to prevent this sort of intent 
from forming, but in trying to prevent the inevitable and the predictable, a 
guest worker program would be destined for long-term policy failure. 
While it is difficult to determine what percentage of temporary migrants 
will inevitably form this permanent intent, ensuring that immigrant incor-
  
Stan L Rev 809, 827–29 (2007). 
 111 Id at 828. As Cox and Posner use it, the concept of country-specific investment has a very 
particular meaning; it involves investment in skills or relationships that are not transferable outside the 
U.S. Id at 828. Learning English, therefore, would not be a country-specific investment, given the 
prevalence of the language around the world. But as Hiroshi Motomura points out, this concept of 
country specific investment may be too narrow. “[I]mmigrants who face ex post screening will feel less 
attached to and accepted by the host country, and immigrants will feel more attached and accepted 
where ex ante screening is the norm. These effects have little to do with whether an investment is 
country specific.” Motomura, 59 Stan L Rev at 864 (cited in note 26). The key issue, ultimately, is 
whether a given immigration policy gives immigrants the incentive to become attached to and learn 
about American society. Programs that provide no right to remain, or no security with respect to long-
term prospects, are less like to accomplish this objective. 
 112 For various discussions of this development, consider Peggy Levitt and Mary C. Waters, eds, 
The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation (Russell Sage 2002). 
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poration is successful demands that we take into account the fact that de-
spite the initial temporary intentions of most migrants, intentions can and 
do change. 
As David Martin has pointed out, Mexico’s assurances that Mexican 
migration is largely circular and the accompanying polling data of migrants 
demonstrating their temporary intent may well be misleading, particularly 
given the historical track record of guest worker programs.113 Despite the 
fact that migration always has been cyclical or transnational in nature,114 
sizeable populations of immigrants made up of people who initially pos-
sessed temporary intent nonetheless have always maintained a semi-
permanent or permanent residence in the United States. As a historical mat-
ter, guest worker programs have remained temporary only when accompa-
nied with harsh enforcement measures. As Europe discovered in the 1970s, 
workers who migrate initially with temporary intent often end up 
“sink[ing] roots” into their host society, because workers “aren’t just cogs 
in an economic machine,” but human beings.115 To think that guest worker 
programs will now succeed in channeling temporary migration and curbing 
illegal immigration, despite past failures, because of a new transnational or 
circular Zeitgeist is ultimately misguided. Indeed, millions of migrants 
build their lives inside the United States, despite the fact that they have no 
legal right to do so. 
The reasons migrants develop permanent intent are various and can be 
summed up by the oft-quoted statement of Swiss writer Max Frisch: “We 
asked for workers and people came.”116 Return migration thus can be dif-
ficult to secure.117 Some migrants find that the wage differential between 
what they earn in the United States and what they could earn at home is too 
great to give up, and this encourages them to transform brief stays into 
  
 113 See David A. Martin, What Lures Them Here: Changes to Immigration Law Should Focus Less 
on the Border and More on the Job, Legal Times 58 (May 29, 2006). 
 114 Consider Foner and Alba, The Second Generation from the Last Great Wave of Immigration 
(cited in note 41). As Nancy Foner has emphasized, transnationalism is not a new phenomenon, though 
it is more viable among the second generation today than at the turn of the twentieth century. 
 115 Id. See also Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration at 93 (cited in note 91) 
(noting that “rotation and return rules” in guest worker programs are difficult to implement while 
protecting the human rights of migrants). 
 116 Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration at 93 (cited in note 91). 
 117 See David Abraham, American Jobs but Not the American Dream, NY Times A19 (Jan 9, 
2004) (“[E]xperience shows that guest workers are not good guests: they rarely want to leave. In Ger-
many today there are more than two million people of Muslim Turkish origin, many of whose families 
came as guest workers four decades ago.”). For a discussion of this phenomenon in the European con-
text, see Cindy Hahamovitch, Creating Perfect Immigrants: Guestworkers of the World in Historical 
Perspective, 44 Labor Hist 69, 88 (2003) (“Guestworker programs led to higher rates of unauthorized 
migration whether or not they cycled workers out of the country at the end of each season or year 
because the guest workers who stayed on—with or without state sanction—often sent for relatives and 
friends once they were established. Workers forced to leave at the end of their contracts often returned 
illegally to employers who were quite willing to rehire them and thus save the expense of complying 
with the terms of their government’s temporary worker program.”). 
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longer periods of presence.118 Through the development of social networks 
and the formation of new family ties through LPR or citizen spouses and 
U.S.-born children, a temporary foray to the United States becomes a life 
in the United States. 
Migration flows also tend to be self-perpetuating. What begins on the 
part of guest workers as a desire for economic advancement, or the desire 
to take advantage of opportunities to support a family or fund a project 
back home, gives way to a longer-term interest in reaping the advantages 
of life in the United States, which in turn creates the impulse toward reuni-
fication with extended family and friends who remained behind when the 
guest worker first crossed the border.119 What is more, those workers who 
do return home are more likely to return to the United States illegally at a 
later date, perhaps because their experience has taught them how to navi-
gate the American labor market and has given them an intimate awareness 
of the actual, practical advantages of the wage differential between the 
United States and Mexico, which would only have been an abstraction or 
rumor before their guest worker experience. 
In a similar vein, guest worker programs also lead to the emergence of 
networks that encourage migration by others through information sharing 
and by creating the social support systems that make migration possible.120 
In this sense, guest worker programs facilitate illegal visa overstays as well 
as the unauthorized migration of foreign workers who cannot fulfill the 
criteria of the guest worker program, either because they cannot find a 
sponsoring employer, they have failed the screening requirements of the 
program, or because annual quotas have been met. Guest worker programs 
thus create a ready community into which illegal workers can integrate for 
their survival. 
3. Temporary programs and the threat to mobility. 
Guest worker programs conceived as truly temporary programs fail to 
appreciate the inevitability of changed intent and ultimately undermine 
integrationist goals in three ways. First, by creating an irreconcilable con-
flict between compliance with the law and long-term intent as described 
above, a guest worker program would give rise to new forms of illegality, 
which, as established above, would undermine the incorporation of immi-
grants as a general matter. This illegality arises not only because migrants 
unable to secure visas follow the networks that guest worker programs 
  
 118 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 15 (cited in note 11) (noting that many 
migrant workers “simply abandon their original plans of returning home and prefer to remain in the 
host country instead,” and that “failure to achieve savings targets, often due to lower than expected 
income, may force foreign workers to stay and work in the country much longer than initially in-
tended”). 
 119 Consider Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol (cited in note 21). 
 120 See id. 
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create, but also because many guest workers who run afoul of the require-
ments of their visas remain behind.121 The more intricate the bureaucratic 
maze, the harder compliance is and the more likely it is that a new un-
documented population will arise, despite attempts to create a new legal 
status. Tying a visa to a particular employer, limiting the amount of time a 
worker has to find a new sponsoring employer if he or she loses his or her 
job, permitting guest workers to find jobs only in certain sectors of the 
economy (namely where sufficient native workers cannot be found), limit-
ing the number of times a worker can renew his visa, requiring that a guest 
worker return home for a year before applying for lawful permanent resi-
dence (if that option is available), and restricting the ability of spouses and 
children to work all create new incentives for illegal immigration or visa 
overstay. Though worker visas must come with requirements attached, the 
possibility of illegality should be taken into consideration when setting 
those requirements.122 
Second, temporary worker programs prevent immigrants from taking 
advantage of opportunities in the economy and thus compound immigrant 
isolation123 and delay integration. To the extent that guest worker visas tie 
migrants to particular employers at the initial stage of entry or prevent mi-
grants who lose their jobs or wish to work elsewhere from seeking alterna-
tive employment, they present particular threats to mobility. Such restric-
tions not only make it difficult for migrants to respond to shifts in the labor 
market, but they also make the immigrant uniquely vulnerable to the inter-
ests of the sponsoring employer. But even a guest worker program that 
includes portability as a feature of the visa is still likely to lead to immi-
grant isolation in sectors of the economy, because even a portability regime 
would limit participation to industries that can demonstrate need for immi-
grant labor—industries such as meat packing, construction, domestic work, 
  
 121 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 20–21 (cited in note 11). 
 122 This same caution should guide attempts to devise legalization programs for the undocumented 
population currently residing in the United States. The more obstacles or criteria Congress creates for 
the current undocumented population to overcome before attaining legal status, the less successful a 
legalization program will be in resolving the undocumented problem. 
 123 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 10 (cited in note 11): 
On the one hand, a segmented labour market and the existence of what is often perceived as 
“undesirable work” in “undesirable sectors”, which natives no longer wish to take up, have 
constituted major reasons for the inflow and concentrated employment of foreign workers in 
these sectors. On the other hand, restrictions of the employment of foreign workers to cer-
tain sectors and/or occupations of the host economy has led, or at least contributed, to the 
desertion of these sectors/occupations by native workers, thus giving rise to, or at least ex-
acerbating, the (further) segmentation of the labour market and the emergence of immigrant 
sectors. 
Id. See also Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration at 86 (cited in note 91) (noting 
that “immigrant sectors” in the host economy emerge in the face of temporary worker programs, which 
increases the economy’s need for migrants and which can lead to exploitation in recruitment and em-
ployment of workers). 
 5/11/2007 2:23:32 AM 
1] GUEST WORKERS AND INTEGRATION 45 
 
and agriculture.124 Whether these limitations are justified as forms of pro-
tecting the interests of U.S.-born and LPR workers, the result of such limi-
tations is that employers in these industries become dependent on immi-
grant labor,125 and immigrants remain concentrated in these industries. 
In addition to the obvious restraints this concentration exerts on up-
ward economic mobility, this isolation also makes the cultural and socio-
political forms of assimilation more difficult to navigate. Economic isola-
tion compounds cultural isolation. For migrants whose intents change, the 
strictures on their mobility outlined above become not just disincentives to 
invest in their temporary communities, but serious obstacles to their 
longer-term economic advancement. These limitations on guest workers’ 
movement in the economy during their first years of presence thus are 
likely to delay their assimilation. And, as I discuss in more detail in the 
next section, the emergence of immigrant sectors also contributes to “social 
exclusion” by separating immigrant workers from native workers and into 
identifiable classes.126 Because immigrant sectors of the economy are of-
ten characterized by low wages and poor working conditions,127 their per-
petuation helps fuel the sentiment that immigrant workers are willing to 
work in substandard conditions, whereas Americans are not. This contrib-
utes to the perception that immigrants as “cheap labor” are taking the jobs 
of American workers, thus fueling opposition to immigration generally. 
Third, guest worker programs do not provide a stable basis for 
broader or more challenging forms of integration, because they do not 
guarantee the critical right to remain. Students of immigration and alienage 
law quickly come to realize that the most valuable right of citizenship may 
not be the right to vote or otherwise participate in the political process, but 
rather the right to continued and permanent presence in the society one 
calls home. The right to remain is the precursor to all other forms of par-
ticipation. Mobility depends on the foundational security that permanent 
presence provides. There must, of course, be some sort of transition period 
before immigrants can become citizens, but the difference between an LPR 
and a temporary guest worker is that a legal commitment has been made to 
the former and not the latter; the former is presumptively entitled to per-
  
 124 One potential antidote to this problem is suggested by an immigration reform about to be intro-
duced in Singapore, a country that has long relied on guest workers to fulfill its demanding labor needs 
and that is also facing a population crisis. According to a recent report by the Migration Information 
Source, Singapore is implementing a “new category of flexible, ‘personalized’ employment passes tied 
to the person rather than the employer,” which would allow the foreign worker to change jobs or stay in 
Singapore even after leaving his or her initial employer. See Brenda S.A. Yeoh, Singapore: Hungry for 
Foreign Workers at All Skill Levels (Migration Information Source Jan 2007), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=570> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). 
 125 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 11–12 (cited in note 11) (noting how 
sectors targeted for temporary labor “are often afflicted by lowered wages and deteriorating working 
conditions,” eventually developing a “structural demand” for foreign workers and thus suffering from 
permanent shortages of native workers). 
 126 See id at 12. 
 127 See id at 11–12. 
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manent presence, whereas the latter is not.128 The absence of a commit-
ment, or the uncertainty of one’s status, diminishes incentives critical to 
successful assimilation—incentives to learn English and to integrate into 
larger social networks. A guest worker visa gives immigrants no clear sig-
nals with respect to their place in society, other than as workers. The risk of 
stepping outside communities of co-ethnics is great. But without taking 
these risks, the social capital needed to negotiate a new and diverse society 
becomes hard to develop. The right to remain provides a form of social 
insurance that makes these risks more manageable. 
The policy failures common to many of the guest worker programs 
that have been adopted by societies in the recent past provide powerful 
evidence of these various threats to mobility. Studies of guest worker pro-
grams adopted in other societies underscore that the consequences of adop-
tion are fairly predictable. As Philip Martin, Manola Abella, and Christiane 
Kuptsch have shown, guest worker programs grow far larger and last much 
longer than originally intended.129 Employers become dependent on for-
eign workers and prove reluctant to see guest worker programs come to an 
end. What is promised as a limited solution to a temporary economic need 
often becomes an unwieldy program with an administrative and institu-
tional life of its own. Guest worker programs create expectations and de-
pendencies that cause them to be self-perpetuating and beyond the political 
control of policymakers. 
The consequences of this expansion are evident in our own historical 
experience130 with guest worker programs, which highlights how counter-
  
 128 Of course, the security of LPR status today is not what it once was. The dramatic expansion of 
the definition of aggravated felony alone, among the many highly restrictive changes of the 1996 im-
migration reforms, has made LPR status a precarious one. The central contention of this Article—that 
immigration policy should attempt to facilitate the integration of immigrants—would also demand a 
reform of many of the measures adopted in 1996. For a critique of our legal system’s current conceptu-
alization of lawful permanent residence, see generally Motomura, Americans in Waiting (cited in note 
89). I discuss the important ideas Motomura advances in his book in more detail in Part II B. 
 129 See Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration at 85 (cited in note 91) (noting 
that guest worker programs tend to become larger than originally planned and last longer than origi-
nally intended because of the phenomena of “distortion” and “dependence,” distortion referring to the 
fact that once businesses make investments that assume that migrants will continue to come to the 
United States, they will resist changes to policies that curb the influx of foreign workers, and depend-
ence referring to the fact that migrants, families, communities, and governments of sending societies 
become dependent on the earnings of guest workers and thus resist policy changes as well). See also 
Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 6 (cited in note 11) (analyzing the consequences of 
major temporary foreign worker programs adopted by six different societies in the recent past). Ruhs 
also documents the “bloating” that has occurred, or the “unforeseen prolongation . . . and the initially 
unanticipated increases in the legal admission of foreign workers.” Id at 15–17. See also Kitty Calavita, 
Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. 141 (Routledge 1992) (noting that 
in the 1950s, the average number of braceros entering the United States each year was ten times higher 
than the number admitted during the wartime program of 1942–1947 when a labor emergency had been 
declared). 
 130 In her important study of the Bracero program, Kitty Calavita demonstrates that, despite its 
initial conception in 1942 as a response to wartime labor shortages in the agricultural sector, the 
Bracero programs lasted until 1964, fueled both by Southwestern growers’ evolving dependence on the 
imported labor, as well as by the INS’s own institutional and bureaucratic interests in keeping the 
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productive they can be if their purpose is to prevent undocumented popula-
tions from arising, and if the assimilation of immigrants is our long-term 
goal. As Mae Ngai has demonstrated in powerful detail in her history of 
undocumented immigration, the infamous Bracero program, initially 
adopted to address labor shortages in the agricultural sector in the South-
west during World War II, resulted in what she terms an “imported coloni-
alism”131 unworthy of a liberal democracy.132 During the Bracero era, 
which lasted until the mid-1960s, indicia of exploitation and immigrant 
isolation were rampant, such as violations of contract terms, including pro-
tections for the wages and jobs of native workers and poor working condi-
tions.133 Over time, Mexico lost its ability to control the terms of the pro-
gram,134 a control it had originally negotiated to protect its citizens, and a 
form of control it seeks today. What is more, because many more people 
wanted to enter the United States than were legally permitted, the program 
contributed to the emergence of a new, illegal population,135 an explosion 
that the INS itself took advantage of and perpetuated.136 Indeed, commen-
  
program going. See Calavita, Inside the State at 2–4 (cited in note 129). As Calavita points out, the 
program was created in 1942 through administrative design by the INS and the Departments of State, 
Labor, and Agriculture and through a bilateral agreement with Mexico. Id at 2. Congress initially au-
thorized the program, but in 1947, with the original justification for the program gone because of the 
end of the war, Congress permitted the statutory authorization of the program to expire. Id. However 
for almost twenty years, administrative action led by the INS sustained the program. Id. 
 131 Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 128–29 (cited in note 14). Ngai argues that this colonialism, a 
legacy of the U.S. conquest of northern Mexico in the nineteenth century, arose as the result of U.S. 
immigration policies. Id. These policies created a “racialized, transnational workforce comprising 
various legal status categories across the U.S.-Mexico boundary—Mexican Americans, legal immi-
grants, undocumented migrants, and imported contract workers (braceros)—but which, as a whole, 
remained external to conventional definitions of the American working class and national body.” Id. 
 132 The key features of the Bracero program included a stipulation that Mexican workers would not 
be used to replace domestic workers or be permitted to depress wages in the agricultural sector; guaran-
tees to the braceros of transportation, housing, food, and repatriation, as well as an exemption from 
U.S. military service; the setting of wages at the prevailing rate in the domestic market; and an agree-
ment that braceros would not be subject to discrimination, such as exclusion from “white” areas of 
segregated public accommodations. Id at 139–40. In addition to the Bracero program, other contract 
labor programs operated in the mid-twentieth century in the United States as well. Workers from the 
British West Indies migrated to the Southeast to perform farm labor, and Puerto Ricans, though citi-
zens, performed seasonal agricultural work in the Northeast, under the auspices of the Puerto Rican 
government. See id at 138. 
 133 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 143–44 (cited in note 14). 
 134 See id at 146 (noting that by giving up its right to unilaterally blackball an employer or county, 
Mexico “lost the only practical leverage it had over the determination of wages and the treatment of 
braceros,” and that by agreeing to a policy of recontracting braceros at the border, Mexico effectively 
lost “whatever ability [it] had to control the process of emigration”). 
 135 See id at 147–48, 155–58 (noting that despite a massive enforcement effort known as “Opera-
tion Wetback,” illegal migration continued, partly as the result of border recruitment of workers and 
INS policies intended to rechannel illegal migration into legal migration). 
 136 In her critical study, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S., Kitty 
Calavita observes that: 
To accommodate employers who complained that recruiting braceros from Mexico was ex-
pensive and time-consuming, the INS devised an even simpler arrangement: on-the-spot le-
galization of illegal Mexican farm workers. Indeed, the official policy during this period 
gave priority to illegal immigrants found in the United States. By 1950, the number of 
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tators describe the emergence of a large undocumented population as one 
of the primary legacies of the Bracero experiment.137 
As a result of this experiment, the non-Hispanic population of the 
Southwest readily conflated illegal immigrants with legal immigrants and 
Mexican-American citizens of the United States.138 The emergence of new 
forms of illegality not only compromised public support for immigration 
generally, but also poisoned already encumbered race relations among citi-
zens of the United States. The racial dynamics introduced by the Bracero 
program created tensions within the Mexican-American community as 
well, which resented being associated with the braceros and illegal mi-
grants, but which also was connected to those same people through com-
mon membership in a transnational community and was thus affected by 
the mistreatment and deportation of the migrant workers of the period.139 
Given these events, the specter of the Bracero program may be suffi-
cient reason to reject the guest worker idea out of hand because of its im-
pact on the status of immigrants and Latinos in the United States. Indeed, 
many of the same exploitative conditions have been documented recently 
by the Southern Poverty Law Center as features of the limited guest worker 
programs that persist today. The Center reports that temporary workers 
who have entered the U.S. on the so-called H-2 visas140 are routinely de-
nied their wages, exploited by labor brokers or employers who seize their 
documents, forced to live in substandard conditions, and denied medical 
benefits for on-the-job injuries.141 In other words, the passage of time and 
awareness of the pathologies of the Bracero era have not been sufficient to 
prevent similar conditions from arising in the lives of today’s guest work-
ers. 
  
Mexicans “legalized” and “paroled” to growers as braceros was five times higher than the 
number actually recruited from Mexico. 
Calavita, Inside the State at 2 (cited in note 129). Calavita argues that such INS policies were not sim-
ply the result of the power of the “capitalist class,” or the growers, but that they arose as result of the 
INS’s own institutional and bureaucratic needs, which often put the INS at odds with the Department of 
Labor during the decades-long (mis)management of the Bracero program. See id at 4. 
 137 See, for example, Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican Guest 
Workers, 80 Foreign Aff 117, 123 (2001). 
 138 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 149 (cited in note 14). 
 139 See id at 158–60. 
 140 The H-2 program was originally launched in 1943 and enabled Florida sugar cane growers to 
import workers from the Caribbean. The program was revived in 1986, when Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act. In 2005, approximately 32,000 H-2A, or non-agricultural visas, 
were issued, and approximately 89,000 H-2B, or agricultural visas, were issued. The vast majority of 
these temporary workers come from Mexico, Jamaica, and Guatemala, with approximately three-
quarters of workers coming from Mexico. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery: Guest-
worker Programs in the United States 5 (2007). For an in-depth study of these programs, see David 
Griffith, American Guestworkers: Jamaicans and Mexicans in the US Labor Market (Penn State 2006). 
 141 See Close to Slavery at 2 (cited in note 140). 
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4. Integrating guest workers through institutional design. 
Of course, though the problematic conditions of the Bracero experi-
ence still obtain, it might be possible to learn from past mistakes and avoid 
the common pitfalls of guest worker programs through innovations in insti-
tutional design. The policy panacea proposed at various stages of the de-
bate to prevent some of the dysfunctions outlined above is a guest worker 
program that culminates in an earned path to permanent residence or citi-
zenship. From the United States’ perspective, such a solution might seem 
ideal. Workers come to the U.S. on a probationary basis, and only those 
with the wherewithal to comply with the strictures of the temporary pro-
gram, who prove themselves able to meet certain selection criteria, are 
considered for permanent residence.142 
A temporary visa that comes with the possibility of adjustment of 
status in the future would certainly be consistent with the trends in immi-
gration law discussed above. A large share of the so-called nonimmigrant 
(in other words, temporary) visas allocated by Congress for workers at all 
levels of the employment ladder have become “de facto transitional vi-
sas,”143 making temporary migration a standard path to permanent reset-
tlement. And it should go without saying that no provisional worker pro-
gram adopted should be without a path to permanent residence. 
But the possibility of adjustment may not be sufficient to stave off the 
consequences of a guest worker program I have just outlined. Adjustment 
of status as it is permitted today occurs under highly restrictive circum-
stances involving heavy paper work, complex legal machinations, and high 
fees.144 What is more, forming the intent to remain while on a nonimmi-
grant visa can be grounds for removal.145 The adjustment process could, of 
course, be streamlined, but the need to adjust creates yet another significant 
bureaucratic hurdle for the immigrant to cross. The fact that our immigra-
tion laws have evolved in this way, probably as the result of inertia rather 
than consideration of the desirability of this trend, should not be a suffi-
  
 142 See generally Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev 809 (cited in note 110) (describing how an immi-
gration system might be designed to gather information about potential permanent residents by admit-
ting them with few screening mechanisms and considering their desirability after a period spent in the 
United States). 
 143 See Marc R. Rosenblum, “Comprehensive” Legislation vs. Fundamental Reform: The Limits of 
Current Immigration Proposals 9 (Migration Policy Institute Jan 2006), available at 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PolicyBrief13_Jan06_13.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). See 
also Deborah Waller Meyers, Temporary Worker Programs: A Patchwork Policy Response 11 (Migra-
tion Policy Institute January 2006), available at 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFI_12_Meyers.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007) (explaining 
that a significant portion of temporary workers just adjust to lawful permanent status, demonstrating 
that “[f]or many employers and workers [the temporary worker system] is acting as a transition to 
permanent employment”). 
 144 See Rosenblum, “Comprehensive” Legislation at 9 (cited in note 143). 
 145 Id. Rosenblum concludes that “the nonimmigrant labor migration system lacks transparency, is 
highly inefficient, and in many cases undermines the rule of law.” Id. 
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cient reason for replicating a pattern likely to exacerbate the current un-
documented crisis, given that the guest worker program is meant to address 
an immigrant stream apparently quite willing to circumvent legal require-
ments. 
The success of such promises of adjustment in accommodating those 
who form the intent to remain also depends in large part on the other fea-
tures of the visa program. In debating this alternative, it is important to 
consider whether the other requirements of the program are too strict: Do 
the constraints of the temporary programs make it unlikely that many mi-
grants with permanent intent will ultimately make it to the adjustment 
phase? Is the requirement that workers who lose or leave their jobs find 
employment with another certified employer—a requirement not imposed 
on lawful permanent residents, who have complete freedom of movement 
in the economy—an overly burdensome constraint, or a constraint that 
keeps immigrants locked in certain sectors of the economy? 
Finally, even guest worker programs that promise a path to permanent 
status at some future date give rise to uncertainty with respect to the mi-
grants’ future presence in the United States, thus setting up the wrong in-
centives.146 Again, freedom of movement and risk taking, such as leaving 
the security (or isolation) of one’s community of co-ethnics, depends on 
the security of the right to remain. A visa that leaves the immigrant’s long-
term status undefined does not promote investment by the immigrant in the 
society around him. And even if the immigrant is willing to invest, the 
guest worker formulation nonetheless undermines social reciprocity, which 
ultimately stands as an independent obstacle to integration, which I con-
sider in more detail in the final section of this Article. 
One obvious alternative to a guest worker program with a path to 
earned citizenship would be to dramatically increase the number of LPR 
visas available to unskilled workers. After all, the current admission system 
permits the allocation of only 5,000 per year.147 An LPR visa represents a 
much stronger form of pre-commitment than a guest worker visa with a 
hypothetical possibility of adjustment of status and immediately encour-
ages its bearer to invest in becoming American. The problem, of course, is 
that the current system of LPR admissions, particularly with respect to the 
family preference categories, is beset by backlogs, and the processing of 
permanent visas is a cumbersome process, at least as currently designed. 
Furthermore, the responsibility attached to holding an LPR visa may 
be more than some migrants initially want to take on. The puzzle thus be-
comes how to facilitate temporary migration for those whose cyclical intent 
remains, while simultaneously ensuring that the migrants who decide to 
  
 146 For reasons I explain in more detail in the next Part, for these types of migrants—call them 
semi-permanent migrants—guest worker programs present more of an obstacle to their integration 
because of the ways in which they undermine reciprocity. 
 147 See note 81. 
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remain do not become unlawful once they have exceeded the time limits of 
the guest worker program. Can we devise a visa or set of visas that makes a 
commitment to permanent membership, but that also enables immigrants to 
return home, if that is what they prefer? 
As a policy matter, perhaps the best strategy would be to open up two 
separate paths. As a complement to increasing the number of permanent 
visas for unskilled workers—a long term strategy that will require deep 
reforms in the admissions bureaucracy—we might create a provisional visa 
that enables the quick entry of enough workers to meet current labor mar-
ket needs,148 but that also carries a presumption of adjustment at the end of 
a relatively short period of time—perhaps at the end of a single visa period. 
The critical design issues will involve how easy it is to adjust status, 
whether self-petitioning is permissible, whether there will be quotas on the 
number of provisional workers who can adjust status, and what exactly it 
means for there to be a presumption in favor of adjustment. Though these 
details are beyond the scope of this Article, the crucial point to keep in 
mind is that any policy adopted with a view to curbing undocumented im-
migration and assuring future integration must focus on the inevitability of 
the temporary migrant with permanent intent. 
B. Guest Worker Programs and the Threat to Reciprocity 
Even if we assume, despite all evidence to the contrary, that a guest 
worker program will be the solution to the crisis of unauthorized immigra-
tion, the initial reciprocity gains achieved through the neutralization of the 
illegality problem are likely to be offset by the longer-term impact of creat-
ing a new temporary immigration status. Moreover, even if some combina-
tion of temporary visas with the possibility of adjustment and a meaningful 
increase in the number of available LPR visas for unskilled workers were 
sufficient to secure optimal immigrant mobility, addressing the inevitable 
future demand for entry into the United States by promising Americans a 
temporary guest worker program will still threaten to undermine the recip-
rocity required for assimilation. Guest worker policies simply promise 
Americans too much and ask of them too little. 
1. Policy failures and the threat of backlash. 
In proposing a guest worker program as a prospective solution to the 
problem of unlawful migration, policymakers emphasize that the current 
undocumented population highlights the American economy’s need for 
foreign workers in certain key sectors. As I noted at the outset of this Arti-
cle, guest worker programs therefore promise Americans two things: a 
  
 148 For a proposal of this type, see Abraham, et al, Immigration and America’s Future at 36 (cited 
in note 7) (proposing to dramatically simplify the current visa system by creating provisional visas, 
which would apply across all employment categories, including the unskilled). 
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means of securing essential labor in a way that will not dislocate the 
American worker, and a policy fix that will prevent the emergence of fu-
ture undocumented immigration without opening the door to permanent 
immigrant resettlement. 
But given the preceding discussion, it seems clear that these promises 
are unlikely to be met. When a program billed simultaneously as a solution 
to illegal immigration and a means of serving temporary economic de-
mands results in the reemergence of either unauthorized immigration or the 
apparent resettlement of migrants and their families, the public is likely to 
conclude that the government has lost control of the policymaker’s grand 
plans and thus demand that the plans be abandoned altogether—a major 
reason the Bracero program eventually came to an end.149 As was the case 
during the Bracero era, the rise of illegality, along with general concern 
over working conditions and the saddling of the American worker with 
unfair competition, helps generate resentment of immigration that is often 
expressed as resentment of illegal migration specifically but also reflects 
eroded support for immigration more generally. This erosion ultimately 
threatens the reciprocity required for the absorption of immigrants into the 
fabric of American life. 
The harm of a temporary guest worker policy will, however, include 
more than these previously experienced pitfalls. The guest worker solution, 
in and of itself and regardless of its consequences, fails to promote the nec-
essary reciprocal social adaptation in at least three ways. First, either be-
cause Americans believe guest workers will not be or are not supposed to 
be repeat players, they are given little incentive to incorporate immigrants 
into their neighborhoods, friendship networks, civic and religious associa-
tions, and other forms of organization. Second, guest worker programs do 
not prepare Americans to consider immigrant laborers as actors with le-
gitimate political status, who are entitled to demand action on their behalf 
by government, or demand recognition of their voice in public conversa-
tions about matters that affect the course of their lives in the United States. 
Finally, guest worker policies reinforce the perception that immigrants 
bring with them foreign cultures, as opposed to cultural identities that must 
in some way be integrated into conceptions of American culture. In other 
words, the guest worker formulation ensures that the forms of cultural dis-
tinctiveness—linguistic and otherwise—that immigration inevitably intro-
duces into the receiving society will not be normalized, but instead will 
continue to be thought of as foreign. 
Of course, the idea of the guest worker may on one level lead to 
greater acceptance of cultural distinctiveness. After all, if the worker’s 
presence is temporary, there is no need for him to adapt to the surrounding 
  
 149 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 161–66 (cited in note 14) (discussing the variety of factors that 
led to the end of the Bracero program, including pressure from labor unions and civil rights activists, as 
well as heightened public awareness). 
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culture in the United States. This form of acceptance might even translate 
into greater tolerance of non-English-speaking children in the public 
schools and a corresponding willingness to support forms of instruction 
that emphasize the language, history, and culture of Mexico and the rest of 
Latin America—forms of instruction less likely to be tolerated for immi-
grants on the path to permanent residence. 
Yet the obligations the United States might have as the host of tempo-
rary workers, particularly to the spouses and children of those workers, 
have scarcely been addressed in the public debate. And the cultural recip-
rocity required for immigrant assimilation to succeed is not acceptance of 
the presence of foreign cultures in the American midst, but rather a toler-
ance for the hybrid forms of cultural identity that assimilation produces, as 
well as acceptance of a public sphere that includes other languages, cele-
brations, forms of recreation, and forms of social organization. 
In the end, guest worker programs offer an ad hoc solution to a persis-
tent problem. As a policy solution, they leave for a later date a reality 
Americans must confront. Instead of devising technocratic quick fixes to 
the crisis that is pushing policymakers to address immigration in the first 
place, Congress and the American people should come to terms with the 
reality of the interdependence of the United States and Mexico and with the 
reality that Americans and Mexicans, and to a lesser extent other Latin 
Americans, are in an important sense part of the same society, which for 
the foreseeable future means the permanent presence of migrants within 
our borders. 
2. Guest worker programs as a failure of reciprocal obligation. 
For a variety of compelling reasons, political theorists have criticized 
the concept of the guest worker as inconsistent with liberal values. Michael 
Walzer’s rejection of the guest worker formulation in his analysis of immi-
gration in Spheres of Justice remains a touchstone for theoretical reflection 
on such proposals and is therefore worth considering in some detail. Wal-
zer begins from the premise that membership is the primary good we dis-
tribute to one another, serving, as it does, as the individual’s guarantee of 
security, welfare, and protection from the vicissitudes of the market.150 
Existing members of a political community have a right to distribute mem-
bership, thereby shaping their population.151 This distribution is subject 
only to the limitations imposed by the meaning existing members give to 
the concept of membership and the duties of mutual aid we owe to strang-
ers.152 
  
 150 See Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 31–32 (cited in note 17). 
 151 Id at 52. 
 152 Id. 
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But, as Walzer emphasizes, though a state has a right to control whom 
it admits, every immigrant admitted should be a potential citizen. He 
writes, “members must be prepared to accept, as their own equals in a 
world of shared obligation, the men and women they admit.”153 In return, 
“immigrants must be prepared to share the obligation.”154 This relationship 
is, in a sense, one of perfect reciprocity. 
On the face of things, guest worker programs might seem to promote 
reciprocity. The receiving society has engineered for itself and the guest 
worker an apparent bargain. Workers send money home they otherwise 
would not have had, and the receiving society saves as well. Though the 
receiving society loses something in the form of the remittances sent else-
where and must, under some programs, spend to provide housing for their 
new guests, these costs are probably lower than the investment that would 
have been required had the migrants come in as future citizens. The lost 
remittances must be less than the cost of shaking up the domestic labor 
market and existing labor law consensus to channel citizen workers into the 
jobs that guest workers would otherwise fill.155 
But the bargain is only short term, and its success is contingent. The 
employer ends up in the most favorable position, because his labor needs 
have been met. The guest worker is also better off than he would have been 
had he entered the country illegally. But because migrants’ intents change 
in ways they could not have foreseen when they entered into the guest 
worker contract,156 guest worker programs that are truly temporary ulti-
mately force migrants into an untenable choice: either to become unauthor-
ized when their visas have expired or compromise the economic, social, 
and familial ties they have forged during their time as guest workers and 
return home. In addition to becoming a constraint on the guest worker 
whose intent changes, the initial Pareto superior bargain also imposes ex-
ternalities on society. By creating a temporary laboring class without full 
participation rights, or even the prospect of full participation rights, such 
programs introduce opportunities for exploitation and inequalities into so-
  
 153 Id. 
 154 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 52 (cited in note 17). 
 155 See id at 56–58. See also Chang, 78 Chi Kent L Rev at 314 (cited in note 73) (“The empirical 
evidence indicates that immigrants are likely to make a positive contribution to the public treasury 
through the taxes they pay during their working years and impose a burden only if they remain in the 
United States for their retirement years and gain access to public benefits.”). 
 156 See Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1497 (cited in note 21), which states: 
At the individual level, participation in high-wage economy induces changes in tastes and 
motivations that turn people away from target earning and toward persistent migration. Sat-
isfaction of the wants that originally led to migration creates new wants. Access to high 
wages and the goods they buy creates new standards of material well-being, and first-hand 
experience in an affluent society raises expectations and create new ambitions for upward 
mobility. As migrants earn high wages and alter their consumption patterns, they adopt new 
lifestyles and local economic pursuits become less attractive. 
Id (citations omitted). 
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cial, political, and economic relations that are unacceptable in a democratic 
society that depends on the ongoing consent of its subjects and an absence 
of castes.157 As a policy matter, given the predictable externalities, it is no 
answer to say that the guest worker willingly entered into the temporary 
contract, which underscores the absence of true reciprocity in the guest 
worker arrangement. As Walzer points out, guest workers are not truly 
guests, nor are they like tourists.158 In Walzer’s analogy, guest worker 
programs create live-in servants, hired to perform the tasks members of the 
family eschew.159 They perform “socially necessary work” and are im-
mersed in and subject to the legal system of the society in which they la-
bor.160 The treatment of guest workers should be governed by principles of 
justice, which demand that the guest worker have the choice about whether 
to remain or return home.161 But the power of the state looms tyrannically 
over guest workers in the form of the constant threat of deportation,162 and, 
I would add, the threat of having to become an undocumented immigrant if 
one cannot meet the terms of the guest worker visa. This power is interre-
lated with and augments the power of the employer, who holds the keys to 
the guest worker’s right to remain and therefore acts with a form of author-
ity over the worker to which citizens and LPRs are not subject. 
In his recent work calling for a reconceptualization of our ideas of 
citizenship, Hiroshi Motomura articulates a vision of permanent commit-
ment to immigrants that has certain affinities with Walzer’s views on the 
importance of equal membership. Motomura calls for a revival of the con-
cept of “Americans in waiting,” or for treating immigrants not as strangers, 
as we largely do today,163 but as future citizens, as was the practice before 
1952, the year Congress passed the major statute that now governs all of 
  
 157 See Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 58–59 (cited in note 17). Note, the guest worker programs 
Walzer critiques are those that bar workers from future citizenship. Those admitted with the promise of 
future citizenship, according to Walzer, would temporarily occupy the lower rungs of the economy but 
would benefit from welfare and union protections and could, through their initiative, outdo and there-
fore move past local workers. See id at 56. Whether Walzer would accept a guest worker program that 
promises a path to citizenship is unclear, though it would probably depend on how secure the law 
makes that path. Walzer explicitly notes that the only acceptable conditions on naturalization are time 
and “qualification,” but he does not specify what legitimate qualifications would be. Id at 60. What is 
more, despite the potential availability of adjustment, many of the same conditions Walzer decries are 
likely to result from a guest worker program whether it promises a path to citizenship or not, including 
the poor working conditions, and the failure of the existing population to regard guest workers as fel-
low citizens. It seems unlikely that the largely formal innovation of making adjustment of status avail-
able at the end of a certain number of visa cycles will cure the problems that have characterized most of 
the twentieth century’s guest worker programs. 
 158 Id at 59. 
 159 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 58–59 (cited in note 17). 
 160 Id at 60. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See id at 58–59. See also the discussion of the ways in which the various bureaucratic require-
ments of guest worker programs engender serious insecurities in the legal status of the guest worker in 
Part II A 2. 
 163 See Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 9 (cited in note 89). 
 5/11/2007 2:23:32 AM 
56 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2007 
 
immigration law.164 According to this form of membership, immigrants 
would be entitled to treatment as essentially full American citizens as they 
follow the path the law lays out to full membership.165 Under his proposal, 
lawful immigrants would be permitted to sponsor their close relatives for 
admission in the same ways as citizens, immigrants would be permitted to 
vote, and immigrants would be eligible for the same public benefits as citi-
zens.166 The idea of Americans-in-waiting presumably stems from a belief, 
similar to Walzer’s, that democracy is impoverished when those who are 
governed by the law have no voice in its conception.167 Motomura’s per-
spective also suggests that, by making an early commitment to the inclu-
sion of immigrants into the polity, our law will not only make good on 
liberalism’s promise of equal treatment, but also will promote affection for 
the body politic and the American community among new arrivals by 
promising them full membership from the outset, thus promoting immi-
grant integration.168 
My conception of reciprocity has much in common with these posi-
tions, based as it is on the idea that the incorporation of immigrants de-
pends on the willingness of citizens and residents to accept immigrants into 
their political and social institutions and to giving immigrants security that 
will encourage their investment in American society. As I have made clear 
throughout, like Motomura, I believe that the “we/they” lines we draw 
should be based on the fact that many of the “them” will inevitably become 
“us,”169 if not in the immigrant generation itself, certainly in the second 
generation, by virtue of our birthright citizenship rule. 
Motomura’s conception of immigrants in transition goes a step further 
than my own, as I have articulated it thus far, because it reveals the limita-
tions of our current system of lawful permanent residence, demonstrating 
that even the ostensibly permanent admission system is not supported by a 
conception of immigration that views immigrants as potentially permanent 
members of our society.170 Given the increasing insecurity of LPR status, 
  
 164 See id at 8. Motomura notes that, from 1795 to 1952, every applicant for naturalization was 
required to file a “declaration of intent” several years in advance, which in turn elevated the immigrant 
to a unique pre-citizenship status. Id, citing Act of Jan 29, 1795, ch 20, § 1, 1 Stat 414, 414. 
 165 For earlier work exploring these themes, see Gerald Rosenberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: 
Why not the Right to Vote, 75 Mich L Rev 1092 (1977) (arguing that lawful permanent residents em-
body qualities that should make them full members of society); and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, 
Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution 7 Con Comm 9 (1990) (arguing that lawful permanent resi-
dents should be thought of as members). 
 166 See id at 13. 
 167 See Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 151 (cited in note 89). 
 168 Compare Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 827–28 (cited in note 110) (noting that “risk-averse 
noncitizens who do not know whether they will be retained may be reluctant to come to the country and 
make country-specific investments,” which are defined as “investments whose return can be obtained 
only through continued residence in the country”). 
 169 See Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 14 (cited in note 89). 
 170 Motomura identifies two other conceptions of immigration at work in our system: “immigration 
as contract” and “immigration as affiliation.” See id at 9–11. According to immigration as contract, 
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expanding the numbers of LPR visas available to unskilled workers may 
not, therefore, enable mobility and secure reciprocity as broadly as I would 
advocate. The difference between LPR visas and guest worker visas may 
be of degree rather than kind. Regardless, the degrees of differences be-
tween the two are critical and worth emphasizing in the current debate, 
though I would not foreclose a complete reorientation of the system gov-
erning the rights of LPRs to remain in the U.S. for the same reasons that I 
am wary of guest worker programs. 
Though I share Walzer’s skepticism about the compatibility of guest 
worker programs and liberal democratic society, the core of my critique of 
the guest worker program does not depend on taking a communitarian 
point of view and emphasizing preservation of the tight-knit communities 
necessary to social bonding and self-government, as Walzer’s does. The 
idea of reciprocity, or of mutual obligation as I present it, is built into lib-
eral conceptions of society as a cooperative scheme that depends on a sense 
of obligation to regard those with whom we associate as members entitled 
to equal concern. 
Not only does the idea of obligation stemming from association ren-
der guest worker programs problematic, it also calls into question strict 
admissions decisions. In his discussion, Walzer implies that the United 
States is justified in imposing restrictions on initial admissions as a way of 
avoiding the unseemly results of a guest worker experiment; rather than 
embroil itself in the creation of a mini-tyranny within a democratic society, 
the wall precluding entrance altogether should remain high. But under cur-
rent conditions in the U.S., we must extend the concept of reciprocity to 
our admissions decisions. The pretense that we can avoid internal inequali-
ties by restricting immigration is not only exposed as a pretense by the 
brute fact of undocumented immigration, it is also inconsistent with our 
behavior as a society. 
In addition, as I have emphasized throughout this Article, the commu-
nitarian’s faith that restrictions on admissions at the border will prevent the 
pathologies of a guest worker program from arising is misplaced. The in-
evitability of current migration means that if we do not adopt new forms of 
permanent membership, we will find ourselves either with a guest worker 
program as a second-best option, or a compounded crisis of illegal immi-
gration, which would be even worse. Walzer’s world is simply not achiev-
able. To avoid these pitfalls, we must resist restrictionist tendencies in our 
  
immigrants agree to abide by the law and are subject to deportation, basically under whatever terms the 
government decides are warranted. See id at 9–10. The elaborate maze of grounds of admissibility and 
deportability, the fact that courts have no difficulty finding changes in the immigration law to apply 
retroactively, and the fact that there are no external constitutional limits on Congress’ power to estab-
lish grounds of inadmissibility and deportability support this view. According to immigration as affilia-
tion, the treatment of immigrants should depend on the ties that they have inside the United States. See 
id at 10–11. The fact that the family preference categories dominate the LPR admissions categories, as 
well as admissions more generally (through the unlimited admission of spouses and children of U.S. 
citizens) reflects this view. 
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admissions policies and be open to shifts in the permanent characteristics 
of our demography, creating rules of membership that facilitate the accep-
tance of these changes. 
Put slightly differently, the fact is that United States as a sovereign en-
tity is not in complete control of its membership rules. Walzer and other 
theorists who write about the legitimacy of restricting immigration as if 
such complete control existed seem to ignore this reality.171 Walzer defines 
membership as “a social good constituted by our understanding,” meaning 
that the current members of a society decide, through “work and conversa-
tion,” to which strangers or aliens to give the good of membership.172 But 
forces beyond the control of Congress—namely market and social realities 
in the U.S. and Mexico—are creating new members of American society in 
the form of undocumented migrants or members without legal status. In 
other words, the distribution of membership does not occur and is not oc-
curring through a centralized entity; the centrally controlled naturalization 
process is hardly the only means through which new members of American 
society are being created. Congress is now behaving reactively and is under 
great pressure to create new channels of membership through legalization 
and guest worker programs, channels that might be very different from 
those we would establish in an unconstrained world. 
As I emphasized in Part I, the illegal migrants of today and the guest 
workers of the future come to the United States as the result of bidirec-
tional forms of association, or because of hemispheric interconnectedness. 
Though this interconnectedness may begin as a matter of economics, our 
economic choices result in the creation of social networks that facilitate 
migration, even once the economic incentives for migration fade173—
networks of which U.S. residents are as much the authors as the immi-
grants themselves. The idea that obligations to others arise from our asso-
ciation with them requires that we expand our conceptions of political 
community. This observation does not mean that restrictions on admissions 
will not be appropriate in other contexts, but with respect to the phenome-
non that is the focus of this paper, such restrictions must be limited. 
* * * 
We thus are faced with the need to adapt or find ways to absorb large-
scale immigration. We can conceptualize this need in two ways—as a mat-
  
 171 The idea of membership distribution is supported by a distinction between members and strang-
ers that Walzer defends. The existence of this distinction means that admissions decisions must be 
made by political communities, and it means that those decisions are rarely criticized as a failure of 
distributive justice. Admissions decisions may be criticized to the extent that they display a lack of 
charity—a criticism that reflects the idea that we owe strangers a duty of mutual aid—but the scope of 
our obligations to strangers, in Walzer’s view, is clearly limited, and does not appear to require certain 
types of admissions decisions over others. See Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 33–34 (cited in note 17). 
 172 Id at 32. 
 173 See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 17 (cited in note 21). 
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ter of pragmatics and as a matter of obligation. Either way, whether Ameri-
cans like it or not, the social conditions that are generating the current wave 
of immigration are producing a population of semi-permanent and perma-
nent settlers. Our commitment to certain political principles—to living in a 
liberal democracy without castes—as well as to a desire to live in social 
peace, require that we incorporate these immigrants into mainstream social 
and political institutions. But by characterizing immigrants as temporary 
sojourners, the very idea of a guest worker program frames immigration as 
a temporary solution to the needs of Americans, as opposed to a social 
condition to which Americans must adapt. 
CONCLUSION 
I began from the premise that guest worker programs represent a pro-
spective solution to undocumented immigration. In that sense, these pro-
grams offer a productive approach to contemplating the current immigra-
tion phenomenon and an essential policy complement to proposals for 
stricter enforcement at the border and in the interior. It is difficult to spec-
ify how much of the current anxiety concerning immigration results from 
the high levels of unauthorized migration, and how much is simply a reac-
tion to large-scale immigration in general, with “illegal” status serving as a 
convenient outlet for a more general frustration. But policies that reduce 
illegal immigration are likely to help shape American attitudes concerning 
immigration to correspond with our national mythology as a country that 
welcomes immigrants and thrives because of their presence. The cycle in 
which the United States finds itself—of permitting an undocumented popu-
lation to accumulate as the result of under-enforcement and the failure to 
update the legal immigration system to changing demographic pressures, 
followed by immigration reform that includes legalization of undocu-
mented migrants—is unhealthy, if only because it erodes support for the 
immigration that is both an inevitable and necessary part of the country’s 
future. 
But as a means of breaking this unproductive cycle, a guest worker 
program promises short-term benefits and long-term friction. Because tem-
porary worker programs are being proposed to channel migration flows 
with semi-permanent to permanent time horizons, they should be adopted 
only to the extent that they are consistent with the long-term objectives of 
assimilation. But by limiting immigrant mobility and failing to encourage 
reciprocity on the part of Americans, guest worker programs fall short of 
that objective. Our long-term interest in assimilation would be far better 
served by substantially expanding opportunities for permanent member-
ship, perhaps by expanding the number of LPR visas available to unskilled 
immigrants and raising the country ceilings on immigration from key parts 
of the world, namely Mexico. Of course, given the current political cli-
mate, a guest worker program may be a second-best solution: we might not 
have sufficient political will or administrative capacity to support these 
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greater reforms, and a guest worker program is certainly preferable to the 
persistence of undocumented immigration. That said, though our nation’s 
history of adapting to immigration has unfolded in a decidedly mixed way, 
in the end, a guest worker program is not worthy of the principles of oppor-
tunity, equality, and mutual respect among members that characterize the 
aspect of American immigration history we should strive to perpetuate. 
